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Relations
Consular
on
2 Vienna Convention
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tice (ICJ) has jurisdiction to resolve any disputes between state parties
arising under the treaty.3 In a 2003 opinion, the ICJ ordered the
United States to provide a remedy in the form of additional review for
fifty-one Mexican nationals on death row in the United States. 4 One
of these Mexican defendants, Jose Ernesto Medellin, subsequently requested federal habeas relief on the basis of the ICJ opinion. 5 The
Supreme Court granted certiorariin Medellin's case, but in May 2005
dismissed the case on the ground that certiorari had been improvidently granted. 6 What effect U.S. federal courts should give the ICJ
opinion, including the ICJ's interpretation of obligations under the
VCCR and the nature of remedies for non-notification, was thus left
unresolved.
A year later, the Court revisited the question of vertical treaty enforcement in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon.7 On the question of what effect U.S. courts should give to the ICJ's interpretation of a treaty, the
Court in Sanchez-Llamas noted that while the ICJ ruling was entitled to
"respectful consideration," in the absence of specific language in the
treaty, the Court was final arbiter on what remedies for failure to notify would be available to individual defendants in U.S. courts.8 The
Court therefore held that the remedies requested-suppression of incriminating statements and habeas review of a procedurally defaulted
claim-were not constitutionally required.9 In short, the Court rejected the contention that "'the United States is obligated to comply
'with the Convention, as interpretedby the ICJ.' ,, ChiefJustice Roberts,
3 Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, 596
U.N.T.S. 487 [hereinafter Optional Protocol].
4 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 .C.J. 1, para. 12, at
11 (Mar. 31), available at http://www.icj-cj.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusjudgment/imus imusjudgment20040331 .pdf.
5 Medellin, 544 U.S. at 662; see infra Part II.A. (discussing the Medellin case).
6 Medellin, 544 U.S. at 667.
7 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006). Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 620 (2005) (cert.
granted), was consolidated with a Virginia case, Bustillo v. Johnson, 126 S. Ct. 621
(2005) (cert. granted).
8 Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2683 (quoting Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375
(1998)); see infra Part II; see also infra Part III (discussing remedies under the treaty).
9 Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S. Ct. at 2687-88. The majority did not address the question of whether the VCCR created a judicially cognizable fight, instead holding that,
even if the treaty did create ajudicially cognizable right, (1) the remedy sought in the
Bustillo case (suppression of statements) was not available for violation of the notification provision; and (2) the post-conviction review of the Article 36 violation sought in
Sanchez-Llamas had been procedurally defaulted. Id.
10 Id. at 2683 (quoting Brief of ICJ Experts as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 11, Sanchez-Llamas, 126 S.Ct. 2669 (Nos. 04-10566 & 05-51)).
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writing for the majority, was clear: "If treaties are to be given effect as
federal law under our legal system, determining their meaning as a
matter of federal law 'is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department.' -]
The academic literature on Medellin and the early analysis of
Sanchez-Llamas focuses on the vertical enforcement of international legal obligations in the United States and the implications of the
12
Court's response to the ICJ for constitutional and international law.
This dominant narrative captures an important aspect of the case, but
misses a significant point about the legacy of Medellin. The central
legacy of the Medellin cases will not be their place in the jurisprudence
of treaty enforcement and compliance. 13 Rather, the enduring legacy
of the VCCR line of cases rests in its role in a larger transnational
norm convergence. The Medellin cases tell the story of the persistent
objection of the United States to any international restrictions on the
death penalty and the efforts of a transnational advocacy network of
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), capital defense attorneys,
and foreign governments to nudge the United States toward limiting
the application of the death penalty, notwithstanding that persistent
objection. The claims in the VCCR cases arose not out of an abstract
concern about U.S. treaty violations, or even out of concerns about
the general effects of failures to notify foreign nationals of their
rights-though, to be sure, these concerns motivated particular actors
at particular times. That these cases arose at all was because the
United States was out of step with an international trend toward de
facto and de jure abolition of the death penalty.
Popular support for the death penalty in the United States has a
long provenance.' 4 At a time when international and foreign law and
practice was moving toward abolition, American legislative trends in
the late 1990s served to reduce the collateral procedural attacks available to capital defendants. 1 5 In response, and notwithstanding the per11
12

Id. at 2684 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
See, e.g., Julian G. Ku, InternationalDelegations and the New World Court Order, 81
WASH. L. REv. 1, 20-23 (2006) (discussing three views of enforceability of the ICJ
decision); see also infra note 88 and accompanying text.
13 See infra Part II. Sanchez-Llamas will likely be a footnote in what will continue to
be a rich tradition of treaty interpretation and elaboration in the federal courts. Indeed, Sanchez-Llamas may not even be the last word on remedies under the VCCR, as
the Court largely left to the states the scope and extent of judicial remedies for non-

compliance.
14 See infra Part 11.
15 SeeAntiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, and 42
U.S.C.).
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sistent objection of the United States to accede to any international
obligation to do anything more regarding the death penalty than is
already proscribed by the Eighth Amendment,' 6 litigants seeking to
challenge both the legality of capital punishment and the statutory
restrictions on appeals began to invoke foreign and international law
as evidence of "evolving standards" of the restriction against "cruel
and unusual punishment." Some commentators and judges responded to these tactics by warning about the dangers of invokingby the merest of mention in a judicial opinion-any law to which the
17
United States did not consent.
Much to the consternation of these critics, the Supreme Court
has been receptive to appeals to foreign and international norms
when analyzing evolving standards under the Eighth Amendment. In
just the past three terms, the Court looked to laws and policies beyond
our shores in decisions to ban the death penalty in the case of
juveniles I8 and the mentally retarded. 19 Reaction has ranged from
outrage over the "outsourcing" of American law accompanied by nativist fears of an erosion of sovereignty 2 -and even death threats
againstJustices who deign to discuss foreign or international law 2 t-to

16 See infra notes 134-45 and accompanying text (discussing the reservations the
United States attached to the death penalty regulations in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)).
17 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347-48 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the irrelevance of the views of the world community to interpreting the Constitution); see also Justice Antonin Scalia, Keynote Address at the American Society of
Internatinoal Law Proceedings: Foreign Legal Authority in the Federal Courts (Apr.
2, 2004), in 98 Am. Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 305, 310 (2004) ("If there was any thought
absolutely foreign to the founders of our country, surely it was the notion that we
Americans should be governed the way Europeans are.").
18 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005).
19 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n.21. The Court has also invoked international law in
striking down homosexual sodomy laws. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
20 See, e.g., Laurence E. Rothberg, InternationalLaw, U.S. Sovereignty, and the Death
Penalty, 35 GEo.J. INT'L L. 547, 547-48 (2004). Rothberg argues that "the sovereignty
of the United States regarding a significant aspect of its criminal justice system is
threatened . . . by the insinuation of international and foreign law into U.S. judicial
decision-making regarding certain aspects of death penalty administration." Id. (footnote omitted).
21 See Bill Mears, Justice GinsburgDetails Death Threat, CNN.coM, Mar. 15, 2006,
http://www.cnn.com/2006/LAW/03/15/scotus.threat/index.html (discussing death
threats against Justices O'Connor and Ginsburg from what Ginsburg called an "irrational fringe," who view reference to international law as "a huge threat to our Republic and Constitutional freedom").
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paying attention to its
finally
22
unqualified cheers that the Court was
and foreign courts.
brethren international
be sympathetic as a subYet judges and commentators who may
rights standards set by internastantive or political matter to human
themselves in agreement with
tional treaties, and who also find
tribunals, have been careful
decisions handed down by international
sources is only appro23
to note that the use of foreign and international
the United States.
on
binding
as
construed
priate so long as it is not
on the Court, and notwithstandDespite these expressed limitations
meaningful vertical enforcement
ing the Sanchez-Llamas rejection of
rights claim, something interestof the ICJ interpretation of a human
courts in the past decade.
ing has taken place in state and federal
of its foreign affairs powers has
While the United States in the exercise
of reservations, understandings
become more sophisticated in its use
under the central human
and declarations to limit its obligations
Covenant on Civil and Political
rights regimes (e.g., the International
24
Against Torture (CAT)),25 and
Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention
rejection of other multilateral rehas become more confident in its
Court) 26 practice within U.S.
gimes (e.g., the International Criminal
standards in the one area
courts has moved closer to the international
of Child
InternationalLaw-An End to the Execution
22 See Amnesty Int'l, A Victory for
2005, available at, http://web.amnesty.org/wire/
Offenders in the USA, THE WiNE, Apr.
internadecision in Roper as a "victory for
Court's
the
to
April2005/USA (referring
Executions,
"Barbaric"
Ends
Ban
Court
4
tional law"); Human Rights Watch, Supreme
O52.htm (celebratof executing the
June 20, 2002, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2002/06/20/usdom
practice
end to the "barbaric"
ing the Atkins decision as putting an
Executions,
Child
Ends
Court
Watch, Supreme
2
mentally retarded); Human Rights
31.htm (praising
Mar. 1, 2005, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/03/O1/usdomlO
up as a just
United States can now hold its head
the Roper decision by saying, "[TJ he
society on this issue").
at the American Society of International
23 See Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address
(2003);
Soc'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 265, 266
AM.
in 97
Law Proceedings (Apr. 4, 2003),
96 AM.
Rulings,
Respect to International Tribunal
Harold Hongju Koh, Paying Decent
Supreme
U.S.
Breyer,
Antonin Scalia & Stephen
Soc'v INT'L L. PROC. 45, 46 (2002);
College of Law, U.S. Ass'n of Const'l
Washington
University
Court Justices, American
(Jan. 13, 2005),
of Foreign Court Decisions
200 5 051 3.cfm [hereinLaw Discussion: Constitutional Relevance
/
available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/secle/founders/
after Scalia-Breyer Debate].
S.ExEc.
and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
24 International Covenant on Civil
171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S.
TreatOther Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading
25 Convention Against Torture and
100-20
No.
Doc.
TREArY
S.
1984,
Dec. 10,
ment or Punishment, opened for signature
on June 26, 1987) [hereinafter Convenforce
into
(entered
85
(1988), 1465 U.N.T.S.
tion Against Torture].
and
U.S. Under Sec'y of State for Arms Control
26 See Letter fromJohn R. Bolton,
http://www.state.
at
available
2002),
Gen. (May 6,
Int'l Sec., to Kofi Annan, U.N. Sec'y
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influence: the death
where it2 7has steadfastly rejected international
penalty.

notification and assisIn the Medellin cases, the VCCR consular
portal," a formal procedural
tance provisions operated as a "norm
on the death penalty could
mechanism through which external norms
I use the term "norm portal"
be imported into the U.S. legal system.
allows, through a formal procedural
to describe any horizontalgateway that
of external norms into a legal
mechanism or substantive right, the importation
alternative pathway for internasystem.28 A norm portal represents an
a legal system. Where those
tional human rights norms to enter
through traditional vertical
norms may not otherwise be enforceable
the importing state has not
adjudicatory processes-either because
obligation, or because vertical juformally adopted the human rights
it-the norm portal permits
dicial structures have failed to enforce
forcing mediation between
those norms to seep into the legal system,
standard. A norm portal has the
the external norm and the domestic
in that it relies on a binding procharacteristic of being both formal,
horizontal, in that it operates
cedural obligation such as a treaty, and
effect to-an international norm
to import or export-and thus gives
command of an international
across state borders without the vertical 29
court.
tribunal or the highest domestic

advocacy support
The VCCR norm portal enabled a transnational
NGOs, international and
network comprised of individual advocates,
governments to support the
regional organizations, and foreign state
in legal and political advodefense of capital defendants and engage
level.3 0 The network was successful
cacy at the federal, state and local
of cases,

review in dozens
in winning clemency in one case, additional
procedural rights for foreign napassing two state statutes codifying
through which the United
tionals, and setting general conditions
obligations. Compliance
States complies with its consular notification
turn permitted foreign governwith the notification obligation has in
on behalf of their nationals and therefore
ments to advocate directly
31
avoid death sentences.
did not intend
99 6 8
.htm (indicating that the United States
gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2002/
of the International Criminal Court).
to become a party to the Rome Statute
27 See infra Part II.B.
to spatial
norm portals is limited, at this stage,
28 See infra Part V. My thinking on
temoperate
however,
may,
Norm portals
portals that operate between legal systems.
Act.
porally, as with the Alien Tort Claims
of other potential forms of norm portals.
discussion
a
for
V,
Part
29 See infra
text for a discussion of Charles Epp's
30 See infra note 55 and accompanying
networks.
notion of transnational advocacy support
31 See infra Part V.
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the persistent objecThis shift has taken place notwithstanding
efforts to constrain its
tion of the United States to any international
any change of official federal
use of capital punishment and without
change in the U.S. position on the
policy about the death penalty or
objection to the abolitionist posiVCCR.32 If the purpose of persistent
regimes was to preserve complete
tion in international human rights
and timing of expansion of
sovereign prerogative over the manner
it appears to have failed, at
criminal procedural rights in this country,
defendants. And, because the
least in regard to foreign national
death penalty was already under
VCCR cases came at a time when the
the United States, the exploitaconcerted attack by advocates within
contributed to the momentum totion of the VCCR norm portal has
abolitionist norm.
ward convergence with the international
of cases as an illustration
This Article examines the Medellin line
and draws conclusions about
of how the VCCR norm portal operates,
human rights converhow norm portals help facilitate international
Part I, I describe current predicgence. It proceeds in five parts. In
rights behavior, and set forth
tive and explanatory accounts of human
Formal Vertical; Informal
a typology of human rights norm transferal:
I
Informal Horizontal. In Part II,
Vertical; Formal Horizontal; and
v. Dretke and the international
examine the "vertical" story of Medellin
penalty that took place beginning
shift toward abolition of the death
the ways in which the consular
in the late 1980s. In Part III, I explore
as a means of mediation befunction has traditionally been conceived
how, by the 1990s, consular protween two national legal systems, and
standards of due process
tection had absorbed formal international
and fair treatment for foreign aliens.
network of human rights
In Part IV, I analyze how a transnational
carried out a concerted and cooractivists, NGOs, and defense lawyers
justice systems into conformdinated effort to bring national criminal
penalty, and in the process
ance with the abolition of the death
question of consular notification
produced a "norm cascade" on the
provided guidance and
in death penalty cases: the U.S. government and local governments
state
training to state and local governments;
courts expanded procedufederal
and
state
trained police and courts;
suppression of confessions
ral remedies for failure to notify (including
claims); and states began to conand ineffective assistance of counsel
the notification requirement.
sider and adopt legislation to enforce
between the legal protections ofThe VCCR now serves to mediate
32

to the notification and assistance
See infra Part III (discussing U.S. commitment
Optional Protocol).
notwithstanding its withdrawal from the

provisions of the VCCR,
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the protections offered by
fered in the state and federal courts and
international human rights law.
cases, the Formal HoriIn Part V, I explain that in the Medellin
by the VCCR norm portal
zontal procedural mechanism afforded
external norm of death penalty
proved most salient to integrating the
portals offer formal entry
abolition into the U.S. legal system. Norm
can confront persistent obpoints through which transnational actors
the international standard. I sugjectors or noncomplying states with
may be at work in other formal
gest that the norm portal mechanism
extradition treaties and interinterstate procedural obligations (e.g.,
integration of internanational refugee law) that facilitate horizontal
critiques of the use of norm
tional human rights. I also raise potential
and sovereignty concerns
portals and conclude that the democracy
and international legal auraised by the use of nonbinding foreign
traction where norm portals are
thority in judicial opinions have less
reflect formal decisions of
adopted, because the portals themselves
to political reversal. Norm porthe political branches and are subject
human rights advocates who are
tals should therefore be embraced by
standards and,
seeking to bring U.S. practice in line with international
United States
the
seek to keep
correspondingly, feared by those who
of the influence of international
walled off from the33 "insidious wiles"
human rights law.
I.

ACCOUNTS OF TRANSNATIONAL
ExPLANATORY AND PREDICTIVE
HuMAN RIGHTS NORm TRANSFER

objected to being bound to
If the United States has persistently
penalty, how can internainternational efforts to abolish the death
of the death penalty in the
tional or foreign law affect the application
law have struggled to
United States? General theories of international
law affects the behavior of
explain how international human rights
of international law seek to
states.3 4 This is primarily because theories
the United
Farewell Address to the People of
33 President George Washington,
States (Sept. 26, 1796), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/washing'htm
people
influence . .. the jealousy of a free
("Against the insidious wiles of foreign
influforeign
that
prove
history and experience
ought to be constantly awake, since
government.").
of republican
ence is one of the most baneful foes
internahelpful typology of general theories of
a
created
has
Hathaway
Oona
34
Coincias
("Compliance
actor models (realism
tional law compliance: (1) rational
as
("Compliance
liberalism
and
as Strategy");
dence"); institutionalism ("Compliance
model
(managerial
models
normative
and (2)
By-Product of Domestic Politics"))
DisCompliance and Fostered by Persuasive
of
Norm
a
to
Due
Is
("Compliance
andJust");
Legitimate
Occurs when Rules Are
course"); fairness model ("Compliance
Are Internal-

Occurs Because Norms
transnational legal process model ("Compliance
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explain how states behave in interaction with one another and how
international rules and institutions affect interstate behavior. The international human rights system, by contrast, addresses itself to two
separate, but related, questions: (1) how states treat the rights of their
own inhabitants; and (2) whether and how states care about human
rights conditions in other states. The prevailing accounts of interna35
tional law are more helpful in responding to the second question.
But theories about interstate relations and rulemaking are less helpful
to answering the first question and explaining human rights behavior
which, for the most part, takes place exclusively through domestic
processes.
The insufficiency of general international law theory to respond
to these questions about human rights behavior has led legal scholars
to look to political science and sociology to supplement our understanding of how law and legal regimes affect human rights practices.
These current approaches fall under three general categories: (1) liberal theory; (2) constructivism/socio-legal theory; and (3) transnational legal process.
A.

Liberal Theory

Liberal theory seeks to account for human rights behavior by examining domestic political structures and processes 3 6 Liberal theory
predicts that certain domestic conditions (eg., commitment to democratic institutions) are prerequisites to achieving state compliance
with its obligations under the international human rights system.37 It
posits that a central purpose of signing onto international obligations
ized")). Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, I1l YALE L.J.
1935, 1935-36 (2002). Hathaway's analysis was limited to how these theories would
predict compliance with human rights treaties to which a state has acceded, in order
to measure the effectiveness of human rights treaties. Id. at 1963-64.
35 1 have written elsewhere about the value, for example, of rational choice analysis to understanding how and when governments adopt foreign policies of human
rights. See Margaret E. McGuinness, Exploring the Limits of InternationalHuman Rights
Law, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 393, 397-98 (2006). The foreign states who participated in the supranational and domestic litigations brought in response to U.S. noncompliance with the VCCR were, in part, motivated by foreign policy considerations,
calculating how and when to leverage their political capital against the United States.
See infra Parts II, IV.
36 Hans Peter Schmitz & Kathryn Sikkink, International Human Rights, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 517, 521 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2001). Liberal theory responds to the neo-liberal institutionalism, which, like classical realism,
emphasizes the role of state interest in creating incentives to enter international institutions that help coordinate behavior. Id.
37 See Hathaway, supra note 34, at 1953.
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is to "lock-in" the commitment to certain domestic behavior in the
future. The rationales for locking-in an obligation among a community of liberal states are based on some instrumentalist rational choice
calculations (for example, membership in trade and security organizations) about the value of liberal international institutions to the ongoing viability and welfare of the state. Of central importance to
compliance, therefore, is the creation of regimes that persuade or coerce appropriate behavior. This is not merely a procedural claim, as
the appropriate behavior among liberal states is premised on the
universality of human rights and the normative value of promoting
s
human rights as a means to achieve global peace.3
In this case, the United States is either not a party to, or has taken
reservations to, the central instruments outlawing or restricting use of
the death penalty. However, the United States is a party to the VCCR.
Liberal theory would suggest that the ratification of that treaty would
create an opportunity for domestic interest groups to bring pressure
on domestic political institutions to comply with the obligation. The
availability of a binding commitment under which to bring pressure
on domestic actors proved salient in the Medellin line of cases.3 9 Because the VCCR is silent on the question of the death penalty, we
need to look beyond liberal theory to find an explanation for how to
change domestic behavior in a state that has expressly objected to the
international standard.
B.

Constructivist and Socio-Legal Accounts

Constructivist and socio-legal accounts of transnational behavior
can help fill some of the gaps in liberal theory, such as how to account
for changes in behavior of a persistent objector who has real power
within the international community. Ryan Goodman and DerekJinks
have criticized traditional liberal internationalist approaches for overemphasizing the processes of coercion and persuasion and misunderstanding or underestimating the role of the element of sociological
acculturation, which they describe as "the general process by which
actors adopt the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the surrounding
culture." 40 This might suggest that, for the United States, the question is not so much how to enforce the international law abolishing
38 See Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT'L ORG. 513, 513-53 (1997); Anne-Marie Slaughter, International
Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 503, 509-14 (1995).
39 See infra Parts IV, V.
40 Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DuKE L.J. 621, 626 (2004).
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the death penalty, since the United States has rejected that obligation,
but how to change the belief patterns that create support for the
death penalty.
Constructivism approaches international relations by focusing
"on the role of ideas, norms, knowledge, culture and argument in
politics, stressing in particular the role of collectively held or 'intersubjective' ideas and understandings on social life." 4 1 Constructivism
does not make any particular claims about substantive outcomes of
these processes, but, like rational choice theory, focuses on the "nature of social life and social change." 42 Whereas in rational choice,
agents (i.e., states) act rationally to maximize their preferences, under
a constructivist approach, "agents and structures are mutually constituted in ways that explain why the political world is so and not otherwise." 43 Whereas rational choice analysis requires the assumption that

actors are motivated primarily by the desire to maximize their utility,
constructivism requires the assumption that actors-including
states-are shaped by the social factors of their milieu. 4 4 For international human rights, constructivism offers a method for analyzing social interactions of states, NGOs, and individuals with one another
and with legal structures that takes into account the power of norms
and ideas. Most important, it offers a framework for assessing the ways
in which norms, ideas and actors interact with domestic processes. 45
One way in which this interaction occurs is through norm entrepreneurs, or transnational advocacy networks, "working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common
discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services." 4 6 This
definition is intended to apply to the nongovernmental actors which
help construct legal rules by calling attention to issues through public-

41 Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research
Programin InternationalRelations and Comparative Politics,4 ANN. REV.POL. Sci. 391, 392
(2001).
42 Id. at 393.
43

Id.

44 Constructivists reject the claim that their approach is unhelpful to understanding causation, noting that "understanding how things are put together and how they
occur . . .is essential in explaining how they behave and what causes political outcomes." Id. at 394. See Paul Schiff Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits of International
Law, 84 TEx. L. REv. 1265, 1272 (2006).
45 See Thomas Risse & Kathryn Sikkink, The Socialization of International Human
Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction to THE POWER OF HUMAN RiGi-rs 1, 3
(Thomas Risse et al. eds., 1999).
46 MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS 2 (1998).
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ity and information campaigns. 47 Where there has previously been no
legal action, these networks can make it amenable to legal action:
"Frames that later appear in the law often originate in groups in civil
society." 48 In the human rights area, constructivism suggests that the
role of the state may therefore be less salient to norm transformation,
as states are often only "reacting to political changes fomented in an
49
increasingly transnational civil society."
In the domestic context, Cass Sunstein has explained the phenomenon of rapid change in social behavior as resulting in "norm
cascades." 50 Malcolm Gladwell has adopted the sociological concept
of "tipping points," to describe the moment when a social idea or
5
norm crosses a magic threshold that leads to widespread adoption. '
Constructivists apply a similar approach to the international system,
looking for tipping points in the spread of ideas or norms across national borders. Studies of transnational advocacy networks suggest
five steps to changing norms in nonconforming states, which could be
considered the transnational norm cascade or tipping point: (1) a situation of domestic repression/nonconformity; (2) initial NGO mobilization and government denial of the right; (3) tactical concessions by
the government; (4) rhetorical acceptance of the human right norm;
52
and, finally, (5) compliant behavior.
The central critique of constructivism is that it is insufficiently
concrete or specific, and thus fails to provide an effective framework
through which to make causal predictions of state behavior and/or to
design a blueprint for regimes or strategies for addressing human
rights violations.5 3 Constructivism may tell us something about global
processes and interactions at a macro level, but to the critics offers
47 Kathryn Sikkink, A Typology of Relations Between Social Movements and International Institutions, 97 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 301, 302 (2003).
48 Id.
49 Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 41, at 400.
50 Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 912
(1996) (defining norm cascades).
51 MALCOLM GLADWELL, THE TIPPING POINT 12-13 (2002).
52 Schmitz & Sikkink, supra note 36, at 531.

53

For an overview of constructivism and its rationalist critics see James Fearon &

Alexander Wendt, Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 36, at 52, 54-58; see alSoJACK L. GOLsMImH &

Emc A. POSNER,

THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

170-72 (2005); Goodman &Jinks,

supra note 40, at 624 ("Regime design debates often turn on unexamined or undefended empirical assumptions about foundational matters such as the conditions

under which external pressure can influence state behavior, which social or political
forces are potentially effective, and the relationship between state preferences and
material and ideational structure at the global level.").
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little help in predicting how a norm shift-for example from tolera54
tion of the death penalty to abolition-will take place.
International relations constructivism can draw useful lessons
from studies of domestic processes to understand how human rights
norm cascades are initiated and sustained. The political scientist
Charles Epp has identified domestic "support structures for legal mobilization" as a dependent variable in accounting for the rights revolution in the United States of the Warren and Burger eras:
[Slustained judicial attention and approval for individual rights
grew primarily out of pressurefrom below, not leadershipfrom above. This

pressure consisted of deliberate, strategic organizing by rights advocates. And strategic rights advocacy became possible because of the
development of ... the support structure for legal mobilization,
consisting of rights-advocacy organizations, rights-advocacy lawyers, and
sources offinancing, particularlygovernment-supportedfinancing.5 5

The process that has come to bear on foreign nationals facing the
death penalty in the United States can be analogized to this type of
56
advocacy support structure.
C.

TransnationalLegal Process

1. Traditional TLP
Harold Koh's theory of transnational legal process (TLP) is based
on broad constructivist notions and provides more specificity about
how international law is integrated into domestic legal systems-that
is, how international law "comes home."5 7 Koh posits that norm-internalization among transnational actors (states, international institutions, NGOs, and individual participants in the legal system) occurs
through three phases: interaction provoked by one or more transnational actors seeking to impose the norm on another actor; interpretation or enunciation of the norm applicable to the situation; and,
54 Goodman & Jinks, supra note 40, at 624 n.5 (citing Jeffrey T. Checkel, The
Constructivist Turn in InternationalRelations Theory, 50 WoRLD POL. 324, 325 (1998)).
55 CHARLES R. Epp, THE RIGHTS REvOLUTION 2-3 (1998) (emphasis added). In
the VCCR context, foreign governments provided some financing to NGOs and advocates. See infra Part lV.A-B.
56 See infra Part IV.B.
57 Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 FrankelLecture: Bringing InternationalLaw Home,
35 Hous. L. REv. 623, 626-27 (1998); see also Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalLegal
Process,75 Nzn. L. R~v. 181, 184-87 (1996); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey
InternationalLaw?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2624-29 (1997) [hereinafter Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?] (reviewing ABRAM CHAS & ANTON A HANDLER CHAYES,
THE NEw SOVEIGNTY (1995) and THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw AND INSTITUTIONS (1995)).
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finally, successful internalization of the norm by the party targeted by
the first party's interaction. 58 "It is through this transnational legal
process, this repeated cycle of interaction, interpretation and internalization, that international law acquires its 'stickiness,' that nation-

states acquire their identity, and that nations come to 'obey' international law out of perceived self-interest." 59
Koh's theory is predictive, even instructional, in terms of governmental and advocacy strategies: "If transnational actors obey international law as a result of repeated interaction with other actors in the
transnational legal process, a first step is to empower more actors to
participate." 60 He also considers the importance of creating additional fora to provide opportunities for interpretation and enunciation of human rights norms and of adopting strategies of social,
political and legal internalization of norms. 6 1 TLP would predict first
a "horizontal"-that is interstate-interaction on a norm, which is
then followed by adoption through "vertical" processes, e.g., judicial
adoption of a norm. In 1997, Koh posited that, in light of the fact that
the existing horizontal transnational regimes in human rights were
notoriously weak, the best compliance strategies may be "vertical strategies of interaction, interpretation, and internalization," by which he
meant working within judicial systems to announce norms that would
bind the political actors who can bring about human rights
62
compliance.
This TLP process of the horizontal interaction followed by vertical process helps explain, for example, the Atkins v. Virginia" and
58

Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?, supra note 57, at 2646.
59 Id. at 2655.
60 Id. at 2656. Koh goes on to explain: "For activists, the constructive role of
international law in the post-Cold War era will be greatly enhanced if nongovernmental organizations seek self-consciously to participate in, influence, and ultimately enforce transnational legal process by promoting the internalization of international
norms into domestic law." Id. at 2658.
61
Id. at 2656-57 ("Legal internalization occurs when an international norm is
incorporated into the domestic legal system through executive action, judicial interpretation, legislative action or some combination of the three.").
62 Id. at 2656. A key participant in the VCCR narrative has written that "Koh's
writings on the 'transnational legal process' provide a useful conceptual framework"
of analysis for understanding the role of international human rights law in death penalty litigation in the United States. Sandra Babcock, The Role of InternationalLaw in
United States Death Penalty Cases, 15 LEinDN J. INT'L L. 367, 369 (2002). Koh has used
his own theory to explain the developments of the VCCR death penalty cases. Harold
Hongju Koh, Paying "DecentRespect" to World Opinion on the Death Penalty, 35 U.C. DA-vS
L. REv. 1085, 1091-97 (2002).
63 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
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Roper v. Simmons64 cases. In those cases, the Court announced standards restricting the death penalty which were in part premised on an
understanding of what the international community required. 6 5 In
the Medellin line of cases, TLP might predict that the VCCR norm will
have best effect when it is formally elaborated through interstate interaction-perhaps facilitated by international institutions-and then
announced by the ICJ or the Supreme Court before being integrated
into constitutional criminal procedural requirements.
2.

Networks

Transnational network theory is a complement to TLP that focuses on the ways disaggregated governmental functions operate
across borders. Anne-Marie Slaughter defines transnational networks
as representing "all the different ways that individual government institutions are interacting with their counterparts either abroad or
above them, alongside more traditional state-to-state interactions. 6 6
A governmental network "is a pattern of regular and purposive relations among like government units working across the borders that
divide countries from one another and that demarcate the 'domestic'
from the 'international' sphere.

'6 7

Horizontal networks are those that

operate across national borders between, for example, counterpart
governmental officials in different countries. 68 A vertical network operates between national entities and supranational entities and requires
"the relatively rare decision by states to delegate their sovereignty to
an institution above them with real power-a court or a regulatory
commission."69
64

543 U.S. 555 (2005).

65 See Harold Hongju Koh, InternationalLaw as Part of Our Law, 98 Am. J. INT'L L.
43, 48-49, 52 (2004); Koh, supra note 62, at 1118-29 (defining transnational or
"transgovernmental" networks as "involv[ing] specialized domestic officials directly interacting with each other").
66 ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEw WORLD ORDER 14 (2004); see also Kal Raustiala,
The Architecture of InternationalCooperation: TransgovernmentalNetworks and the Future of
InternationalLaw, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 4-5 (2002).
67 SLAUGHTER, supra note 66, at 14.

68

Id. at 13.

69

Id. The purest form of vertical judicial network exists at the EU, where the ECJ

has power to bind the courts of member states of the EU. The International Court of
Justice arguably has more limited effect, as it does not serve to directly bind courts in
the same way the ECJ binds national courts of the EU, or the U.S. Supreme Court

binds the federal and state courts. But its decisions are nonetheless binding on state
parties that have acceded to its jurisdiction. It is precisely this question of delegation
of national judicial authority to the ICJ that lies at the heart of the nationalist/internationalist debate in Medellin.
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Judicial networks theory is a sub-species of governmental network
theory that accounts for norm transfer as a reflection ofjudicial interaction-both horizontal (through trans-judicial dialogue) 70 and vertical (giving domestic judicial effect to the opinions of international
tribunals). 7

"

Horizontal judicial dialogue

describes

the process

through which judges from jurisdictions around the world engage in
direct and indirect conversations about the law, which are then reflected in their own opinions.
Direct judicial conversations occur at the myriad and ever-increasing opportunities for judges from around the world to meet one another at conferences, seminars and exchange programs. 72 These
direct encounters are posited as transformative, "socializ[ing] their
members as participants in a common judicial enterprise." 73 They are
also derided as creating "cosmopolitan" judges who envision themselves as attendees at a sort of global cocktail party and who care far
too much about what their colleagues on other supreme courts think
74
of them.
Related to these direct encounters are the indirect, "messy conversations" that Justice Breyer referred to when discussing the citation
of foreign courts by the Supreme Court and citation of our Supreme
Court by high courts in foreign jurisdictions. 7 5 Indirect conversations
also take place semi-vertically between national court opinions and
the opinions of international courts, tribunals and commissions.
70 Dialogue is often cited as the rationale for citation to foreign and international
legal opinions. See, e.g., Breyer, supra note 23, at 266-67; Melissa A. Waters, Mediating
Norms and Identity: The Role of TransnationalJudicialDialogue in Creating and Enforcing
InternationalLaw, 93 GEO. L.J. 487, 488-90 (2005).
71 See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of
National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv 2029, 2086-2123 (2004);Jenny S. Martinez, Towards
an InternationalJudicial
System, 56 STAN. L. REv. 429, 460-77 (2003). For a summary of
the work the American Society of International Law (ASIL) has done is this area, see
FREDRIc L. KiRGis, THE AMERICAN SOCIEmTY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW'S FIRST CENTlnY

(2006). For an example of how ASIL trains U.S. judges on international law, see
DAv wJ. BEDERMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW:

A HANDBOOK

FOR JUDGES

(2003).

72 SLAUGHTER, supra note 66, at 96-99.
73 Id. at 99. I have argued elsewhere that international travel and engagement
with scholars and judges at international seminars may have influenced Justice Harry
Blackmun's "internationalist" turn. Margaret E. McGuinness, The Internationalismof
Justice Harry Blackmun, 70 Mo. L. REv. 1289, 1304-06 (2005).
74 Justice Kennedy has been singled out for such criticism-directly and indirectly-after he authored the majority opinions in Lawrence and Roper. See, e.g.,
Scalia, supra note 17, at 309-10; Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy's
Passionfor Foreign Law Could Change the Supreme Court, NEW YORKER, Sept. 12, 2005, at
42.
75 Scalia-Breyer Debate, supra note 23.
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These conversations are semi-vertical in that they sometimes occur in
discussion of nonbinding, but informative precedent, and sometimes
they are persuasive authority. 76 Where they are between completely
separate courts that operate under the assumption of comity, or judicial equality, they are purely horizontal interaction.
The line between vertical authority and horizontal conversations
is further blurred in the United States as a result of the predominantly
dualist approach to international law within the American constitutional order. 7 7 Indeed, the majority opinion in Sanchez-Llamas sug-

gests that, even where the United States has delegated adjudicatory
authority to a supranational court via treaty obligation, the last-in-time
rule and federalism may limit the enforceability of the international
adjudication. 78 As a result of this dualism, the constitutionality of certain international adjudication has been challenged by some scholars
as representing impermissible delegations of judicial authority. 79
Others have sought to reconcile some delegations as within the powers of the political branches.8 0
Setting aside the constitutionality of giving effect to international
judgments or citing foreign judges, the global judiciary theory is deficient for the separate reason that it has a tendency to overemphasize
the role of judicial elites (supreme and high courts) in the process of
transnational norm transfer.81 Correspondingly, it tends to under76 An example of the latter is the effect of European Court of Human Rights
decisions on constituent national courts in Europe. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 66, at
80-81; see also Laurence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE LJ. 273, 295-96 (1997) (discussing the different
meanings state parties to the European Convention give to the obligation to abide by
ECHR opinions).
77 I say "predominantly" because several constitutional doctrines help save the
application of the international rule. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115(1) (a) (1987) ("An act of Congress supersedes an earlier rule of
international law or a provision of an international agreement as law of the United
States if the purpose of the act to supersede the earlier rule or provision is clear or if
the act and the earlier rule or provision cannot be fairly reconciled."); see also CURTIS
A. BRADLEY &JACK GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 568-80 (2d ed. 2006) (discussing the Charming Betsy doctrine requiring federal courts to construe statutes so
that they do not violate international law).
78 See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2672-73 (2006); infia notes
89-90 and accompanying text.
79 See, e.g., Ku, supra note 12, at 58-63.
80 See, e.g., Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionalityof InternationalDelegations, 104
COLUM. L. REv. 1492 (2004).

81 For a view that nonelite courts have a role to play, see Janet Koven Levit, A Tale
of InternationalLaw in the Heartland:Torres and the Role of State Courts in the Transnational Legal Conversation, 12 TULSAJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 163, 183-86 (2004).
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emphasize the crucial role of litigants, advocacy groups, and, significantly, the trial court judges who oversee the criminal justice system.
It is thus more helpful in explaining whether (and which) federal appellate and Supreme Courtjudges are receptive, as a matter ofjudicial
pre-disposition, to appeals to foreign and international trends, and
less helpful to the project of explaining how and through whom the
transnational dialogue over a particular norm originates.
3.

Responding to the Realist Critiques

A central critique of the TLP and constructivist, socio-legal accounts comes from the realist/rational choice schools of thought to
which these process-oriented theories initially responded.8 2 The realist/rational choice account places nation-states and state action at the
center of events, and attempts to account for all human rights behavior as a reflection of a state monolith balancing fair and decent treatment of its inhabitants against concerns for state security. 83 This
approach is useful insofar as it explains the basic instrumentalism of
states when they act as political entities within international institutions, but it fails to account adequately for the actions of the disaggregated elements of the state in domestic politics and of nonstate
84
actors.
The rational choice "sovereigntist" theorists have a normative
agenda which additionally weakens their positive account: they do not
think states should care about the welfare of individuals in other countries, at least not in the sense of cosmopolitanism or universality. 8 '
The rationale for that normative claim rests on realism-in which
power matters to international relations-and American exceptionalism-which posits that the world may be better off when the hegemon
82 1 do not mean to suggest that rational choice does not explain behavior within
the liberal, constructivist or TLP theories. Each of them assumed, to one degree or
another, that participants in the international legal system act at times to further certain self-interest.
83 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 53, at 170-72; see also Eric A. Posner, International Law and the DisaggregatedState, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 797, 804-19 (2005) (discussing the way nonstate actors influence states to comply with or violate international
law).
84 See Peter J. Spiro, DisaggregatingU.S. Interests in InternationalLaw, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2004, at 195, 198 (discussing the limitations of realist theory to
explain the international human rights system).
85 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 53, at 209-15; see Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel
N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revisionism in InternationalLaw, 119 HARv. L. REv. 1404,

1419 (2006).
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is free to behave without restraint.8 6 I do not intend to respond to
that claim here, but I do intend to demonstrate that the assumptions
about state action underlying the rational choice sovereigntist approach are flawed when applied to international human rights.
The best (or worst) the rational choice sovereigntists can say
about the constructivist and legal process accounts is that they are not
terribly helpful. To be sure, there is frequently a failure to connect
investigatory, descriptive case studies and data collection with the
work being done to systemize and theorize how human rights behavior changes. And it is surely also the case that there are not enough
systematic case studies available against which to test constructivist theories. But perhaps these critics have not been looking in the right
places or do not want to acknowledge processes that are occurring all
around.
D.

A Typology of Norm Transfer

This Article is an effort to connect the theoretical with thick
description. Case studies tend to present the universe from a worm's
eye view. Integrative approaches that take account of the fine details
of a particular litigation along with the interstate interactions that alter and in some cases drive events may be a useful means of explaining the broader legal trends. Examining the action on the ground in
a line of cases that raise claims in U.S. courts-claims that were initiated and elaborated through transnational interactions-can illuminate both how international human rights norms are transmitted and
integrated and the logical limits of vertical and horizontal processes.
Each of these predictive and explanatory accounts can be seen
operating within a typology of methods of international human rights
norm integration: (1) Formal Vertical (supranational and domestic
adjudication of rights); (2) Informal Vertical (norm-setting, aspirational charters and institutions); (3) Formal Horizontal (procedural
legal gateways); (4) Informal Horizontal (informal political and social
interaction, information sharing, and acculturation). 7 As this Article
demonstrates, each of these methods played a role in the Medellfn
cases, and at times, the processes interacted with one another. But
one proved most salient to the ultimate norm shift: the formal horizontal process represented by the VCCR norm portal.
86

GOLDSMITH & POSNER,

supra note 53, at 83-89; see NIALL

THE PRICE OF AMERICA'S EMPIRE

FERGUSON, COLOSSUS:

186-93 (2004).

87 See infra tbl.1 (illustrating examples of each of these methods of norm integration).
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A TALE OF Two LEGAL NoRMs: THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON
CONSULAR RELATIONS MEETS THE ABOLITION OF THE
DEATH PENALrY

The Medellfn story presents, at first blush, a question that is centrally about vertical integration and the command and control aspects
of international law compliance: when must a national court take cognizance of a decision of an international tribunal? The answer to that
question involves a range of highly contested constitutional questions
concerning whether U.S. courts are permitted or required to give effect to ICJ judgments, the constitutionality of the executive branch
placing restrictions on U.S. treaty obligations, the effect of later-intime congressional statutes to U.S. treaty obligations, and the ability of
the federal government to restrict, through international agreement,
s8
the police powers of the federal states.
Medellfn illustrates how the persistent objection of the United
States to abolish the death penalty raised the stakes for international
advocacy networks and ultimately led to the adoption of the VCCR as
a norm portal to affect change in the U.S. legal system. When the
Supreme Court dismissed Medellfn v. Dretke on the ground that certiorarihad been improvidently granted, the Court appeared to be avoiding a question of treaty enforcement of vital importance to the fate of
the petitioner and to dozens of other death row inmates: how should
federal and state courts give effect to a decision of the ICJ? The question was partially resolved by Sanchez-Llamas, in which the Court held
that while the ICJ's earlier decision in Avena was entitled to "respectful consideration," the ICJ interpretation of judicial remedies under
the VCCR was not binding on U.S. courts.8 9 Sanchez-Llamas did not
arise directly from the capital defendants whose rights were at issue in
the ICJ case, and thus the Court's opinion did not address the final
disposition of Medellin, which turns on what judicial effect will be
given to President Bush's decision to abide by the ruling of the ICJ

88 There has been vigorous scholarly debate on these questions. See Curtis Bradley, Lori Fischer Damrosch, & Martin Flaherty, Discussion: Medellin v. Dretke: Federalism and International Law, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 667, 681-88 (2005) (edited
version of debate held at Columbia Law School); David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and
the Nation: The HistoricalFoundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98
MicF. L. REv. 1075, 1278-1310 (2000); Ku, supra note 12, at 20-22; Swaine, supra
note 80, at 1604-11; David Weissbrodt, International Human Rights Law Perspective on
Grutter and Gratz, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 275, at 280-83 (2004); see also Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995).
89 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2672-73 (2006).
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and require the states to provide additional review in those cases. 90
How Medellin came to be heard by the Supreme Court and the implications of Medellin's claims about the import of consular assistance,
had far broader repercussions in death penalty practice in the United
States than the question of constitutional law suggests.
A.

The Vertical Story: Avena and Medellfn v. Dretke

Jose Ernesto Medellin is a Mexican national sitting on death row
in Texas. In 1993, Medellin was convicted of murder in a Texas state
court and sentenced to death. 9 At the time of his arrest, he told the
police that he was Mexican, but he was not informed of his right
under the VCCR to contact the Mexican consulate. 9 2 Medellin was
represented at trial by a court-appointed attorney who failed to raise
the VCCR claim. 93 On April 29, 1997, after a number of appeals, Mexican consular authorities finally learned of Medellin's detention when
94
he wrote to them from death row, and they began assisting him.
Medellin's attorneys on appeal filed a federal habeas corpus petition
in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas in November 2001. Eighteen months later, the district court denied habeas re95
lief on all claims.
In January 2003, while Medellin's case was pending in district
court, the Mexican government initiated proceedings in the International Court of Justice against the United States, alleging violations of
the VCCR in the cases of Medellin and fifty-three other Mexican nationals who had been sentenced to death in state criminal proceedings. 9 6 Mexico argued in its application to the ICJ that the United
90

See Mark Warren, Unanswered Questions Remain After U.S. Supreme Court Ruling,
36 UPDATE, July 2006, http://www3.sympatico.ca/aiwarren/news.html.
91 Medellin v. Cockrell, No. H-01-CV-4078, slip op. at I (S.D. Tex.June 25, 2003).
92 Id. at 18
93 In 1993, the claim was unknown to criminal defense lawyers in the United
States. See infra notes 197-208 and accompanying text.
94 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the United Mexican States in Support of Jose Ernesto Medellin at 3, Ex ParteMedellin, No. AP-75207, 2005 WL 1532996 (Tex. Grim.
App. 2005).
95 Medellin, slip op. at 1.
96 Application Instituting Proceedings, Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mex. v. U.S.), paras. 69-267 (Jan. 9, 2003) [hereinafter Application of Mexico in the
Avena Case), available at http://www.icj-ci.org/cijwww/cdocket/cmus/cmusorder/
cmus._capplication_20030109.PDF. Mexico withdrew its application with respect to
two of the nationals on the grounds that one was a dual national of the United States
and Mexico and upon learning that the second national had, in fact, received notification of his consular rights. See Sarah M. Ray, Comment, Domesticating International
Obligations: How to Ensure U.S. Compliance with the Vienna Convention on ConsularRelaARTICLE
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under the notification
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eral states in which Mexican nationals
97
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of the ICJ). The
993 (outlining the competence
No.
T.S.
1055,
Stat.
59
26, 1945,
I of the OpArticle
of compromissory jurisdiction.
Optional Protocol is an example
tional Protocol provides:
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would act as a command on the
States' obligations under the VCCR
States had relied on the ability of
United States. In 1979, the United
would hold Iran, a VCCR sigthe ICJ to make a pronouncement that
hostages

taking of official U.S.
natory state, legally responsible for the
the Avena case before the ICJ in

in 1979.101 When Mexico brought
footbe following the United States'
January 2003,102 it appeared to
mechsupranational adjudication
steps-availing itself of the binding
anism required under the treaty.
guarantees that detained forArticle 36 of the Vienna Convention
right to notify their consular ofeign nationals are informed of their
is afforded free access and
ficer and that the consular officer
who so requests it:
communication with any national
to communicate with nationals
(1) (a) consular officers shall be free
to them. Nationals of the
access
of the sending State and to have
freedom with respect to commusending State shall have the same
officers of the sending State;
nication with and access to consular
authorities of the receiving
(b) if he so requests, the competent
consular post of the sending
State shall, without delay, inform the
a national of that State is arState if, within its consular district,
to custody pending trial or is derested or committed to prison or
addressed to the
tained in any other manner. Any communication custody or detenin prison,
consular post by the person arrested,
without delay. The
authorities
said
the
tion shall be forwarded by
concerned without delay of
said authorities shall inform the person
his rights under this subparagraph;
to visit a national of the
(c) consular officers shall have the right
or detention, to converse
sending State who is in prison, custody
for his legal representaand correspond with him and to arrange
to visit any national of the sendtion. They shall also have the right
or detention in their district in
ing State who is in prison, custody
consular officers shall repursuance of a judgment. Nevertheless,
who is in0 3prison,
frain from taking action on behalf of a national
action-1
such
expressly opposes
custody or detention if he
or application of the [Vienna]
"Disputes arising out of the interpretation
of the International
jurisdiction
compulsory
Convention shall lie within the
be brought before the Court by a writCourt of justice and may accordingly
the dispute being a Party to the present
ten application made by any party to
Protocol."
note
Protocol on March 5, 2002. See infra
Id. art. I. Mexico acceded to the Optional
391 and accompanying text.
and
in a dispute between the United States
101 In 1980 the ICJ issued a judgment
Diplomatic
States
United
Tehran.
in
staff
Iran involving U.S. diplomatic and consular
Iran), 1980 I.CJ. 3 (May 24).
v.
(U.S.
Tehran
in
Staff
and Consular
the Avena Case, supra note 96.
102 See Application of Mexico in
103 VCCR, supra note 2, art. 36(1).
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the obligations of state
Article 36(2) further provides that, while
"in conformity with the laws
parties to the VCCR shall be exercised
effect to be given
of the state, they must "enable full
and regulations"
this article are
104
1
for which the rights accorded under
to the purposes
intended.
a defendant's criminal
The importance of consular contact to
and Mexican consular offices
case was long recognized by Mexico,
of their nationals as early as
had been active in protecting the interests
5
an additional program in place
the 1920s.10 By 2003, Mexico had
to capital defendants in the
under which it provided direct assistance
experts and investigators, gathUnited States by providing funding for
liaison with Spanish-speaking
ering mitigating evidence, acting as a
nationals are represented
family members, and ensuring that Mexican
counsel. 10 6 At the time of Meby competent and experienced defense
was not in place.
dellin's arrest in 1993, this formal program
its decision, the Avena rulOn March 31, 2004, the ICJ issued
had breached parts of the
ing.107 The court found the United States
others by failing "to inVCCR in the case of Medellin and fifty-three
their rights under that paraform detained Mexican nationals of
consular post of the[ir]
graph" and "to notify the Mexican
the United States violated its
8
detention."10 The court also held that
offices to communicate with
9
obligations "to enable Mexican consular
the Convention.0 The ICJ
and have access to their nationals," under
of the convictions and
denied Mexico's request for annulment
U.S. courts give the death row
sentences. However, it directed that
reconsideration" of their convicinmates effective "judicial review and
without applying procedutions and sentences in light of this failure,
the defendants' claims. 10
of
ral default rules to prevent consideration
104 Id. art. 36(2).
V para. 7, Torres v. State, 2004 WL 3711623
105 Affidavit of Everard Kidder Meade
PCD-04-442) [hereinafter Meade Affidavit].
(Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004) (No.
the Mexican Capital Legal Defense
106 See infra Part IV.B.2.i. (discussing
Program).
(Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. I (Mar. 31),
107 SeeAvena and Other Mexican Nationals
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusjudgment/imus-imus
4
judgment_200 0331 .pdf.
43.
at
108 Id.
109 Id.
one.
its decision by a vote of fourteen to
110 Id. at 53, 60-61. The court reached
Venezuelan
The
judges voted with the majority.
Both the United States and Mexican
by
not the result that would have been predicted
is
This
judge was the lone dissenter.
adjudication
faithful
trumps
often
allegiance
some ICJ critics, who claim that national
Interna& Miguel F.P. de Figueiredo, Is the
Posner
A.
Eric
See
law.
of international
STUD. 599, 624-26 (2005).
tional Court ofJustice Biased?, 34 J. LEGAL
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U.S. courts with the ICJjudgMedellin's attorneys returned to the
and federal habeas claims. Texas
ment in hand to renew their state
VCCR claim, and two federal
courts had previously denied Medellin's
of the Texas courts."' The
courts refused to overturn the rulings
the Fifth Circuit acknowledged the
United States Court of Appeals for
that it was precluded from giving
. 12
ICJ's judgment in Avena, but held
Court precedent '
Supreme
U.S.
prior
by
effect to the judgment
the VCCR claim at trial, the claim
Because Medellin had not raised
the fedunder the 1996 amendments to
was procedurally defaulted
that the VCCR
. 13
Circuit further stated
1 4
eral habeas statute ' The Fifth
individuals.
rights upon
does not serve to confer
certiorarito review the decision
The U.S. Supreme Court granted
two questions:
of the Court of Appeals regarding
whose rights were adjudi1. In a case brought by a Mexican national in the United States apcourt
cated in the AvenaJudgment, must a
any inconsistent United
ply as the rule of decision, notwithstandingthe United States courts
that
States precedent, the Avena holding
conviction and sentence,
must review and reconsider the national's
doctrines?
without resort to procedural default
of a State party to the
2. In a case brought by a foreign nationalUnited States give effect
in the
Vienna Convention, should a court
and AvenaJudgments as a
to the LaGrand [an earlier ICJ decision] and in the interest of unicomity
matter of international judicial
' 15
interpretation?
treaty
form
in a memorandum to the AtPrior to oral argument in the case,
2005, President Bush directed state
torney General on February 28,
in Avena and to review the cases
courts to give effect to the ICJ ruling
Mexican foreign nationals on death
of Medellin and the fifty other
6
stated that he had determined "that
row in the United States.11 Bush
its inter-national obligations under
the United States will discharge
slip op. at 1-4 (S.D. Tex. June 26,
111 Medellin v. Cockrell, No. H-01-CV-4078,
2003).
544 U.S.
270, 280 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. dismissed
112 Medellin v. Dretke, 371 F.3d
finding
(1998),
v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 375
660 (2005). The Fifth Circuit cited Breard like Constitutional claims, can be proceclaims,
that it "ruled that Vienna Convention
case."
penalty
death
durally defaulted, even in a
2
(2000).
)
(e)(
2254(a),
113 28 U.S.C. §
243 F.3d 192,
(citing United States v. Jiminez-Nava,
114 Medellin, 371 F.3d at 280
198 (5th Cir. 2001)).
660 (2005)
at *11, Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S.
115 Petition for Writ of Certiorari
(No. 04-5928), 2004 WL 2851246.
States, to the
W. Bush, President of the United
116 Memorandum from George
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
U.S. Attorney General (Feb. 28, 2005),
releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html.
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the decision of the International Court ofJustice" and that it would do
so "by having State courts give effect to the decision in accordance
with general principles of comity .... "117 While Bush appeared to be
conceding ICJ authority to interpret U.S. obligations under the
VCCR, the United States announced its withdrawal from the Optional
Protocol to the VCCR a week later."" The executive memorandum to
review the cases is still in effect, but the withdrawal from the Optional
Protocol affects future disputes, reversing the earlier decision granting the ICJ decision-making authority over these disputes.
The Court heard argument in Medellin, but dismissed that case
on the grounds that certiorarihad been improvidently granted. 1 9 The
effect of the ICJ decision, and the intervening effect of Bush's memorandum, were submitted and argued before the Texas Criminal Court
of Appeals, which has not issued an opinion as of this writing. 120 What
effect is to be given to the opinion and the memorandum is an interesting question of law, but tangential to my main argument. These
are, in effect, the vertical processes that are less important-not entirely unimportant, just less so-precisely because they can be shut off
by certain executive acts (e.g., withdrawal from the jurisdiction of the
ICJ in future disputes).
It is technically accurate that the issue before the Court in Medellin was not the death penalty in the way that the death penalty was
directly challenged in Atkins and Roper (indeed, Sanchez-Llamas involved noncapital convictions). But the story of how Medellin cases
came to be brought is centrally about the persistence of the death
penalty in the United States and the ways in which horizontal networks emerged to push the abolitionist agenda within U.S. courts.
B.

Abolition of the Death Penalty in InternationalLaw and Practice

Like many legal narratives, the story of the VCCR right to notification and the death penalty in the United States is more complex
(and therefore more interesting) than this initial account of the vertical integration of international law suggests. First, there is the obvious
gap in time between the United States acceding to the VCCR in 1969
and the rise of the VCCR defense in capital cases in the late 1990s.
117 Id.
118 See Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases, WASH. POST, March 10,
2005, at Al (reporting on a letter sent by U.S. Secretary of State Condolezza Rice to
UN. Secretary-General Kofi Annan indicating that the United States was withdrawing
from the Optional Protocol).
119 Medellin, 544 U.S. at 667.
120 ExparteMedellin, No. AP-75207, 2005 WL 1532996 (Tex. Crim. App. filedJune
22, 1995).
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Why did it take thirty years for defense counsel to discover this failure
of notification as a potential defense to or basis of collateral attack in
criminal cases? 12 ' The answer to this question requires an examination of the behavior of the various actors whose interests converge
when foreign nationals are charged with capital crimes in the United
States. The surge of VCCR claims in capital cases occurred only after
the norm shift from international toleration of the death penalty to
abolition.
For many years, some persistent objectors to abolition of the
death penalty took the position that the death penalty should not
even be considered as subject to international interpretation and elaboration on the grounds it was within the U.N. Charter exception for
22
activities "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."'
At the time the ICCPR was being negotiated in 1950, states barely considered a complete international ban on the death penalty.1 - Like
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948,124 the ICCPR
sought to protect the "right to life," but that right enumerated was
limited to protection only against arbitrary deprivations of life.12 5 The

European Charter of 1950 also expressly permitted the death penalty.
State sanctioned executions were lawful so long as certain procedural
rights were observed.
Nonetheless, a modern abolitionist movement began to emerge
in the late 1940s, and the several of the former fascist dictatorships,
including Germany, Austria and Italy abolished the death penalty.' 26
Abolitionism thus grew up outside of, but parallel to, the creation of
the regional and international human rights regimes in the post-war

121 Immigration attorneys discovered the VCCR earlier, because INS had adopted
regulations that required adherence to the notification provisions. See infra Part
111.11, for discussion of the early immigration cases.
122 William A. Schabas, InternationalLaw, Politics,Diplomacy and the Abolition of the
Death Penalty, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 417, 420 (2004) (quoting U.N. Charter art.

2, para. 7).
123 U.N. ESCOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., 6th Sess., 194th mtg., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
SR.194 (1950); ICCPR, supra note 24.
124 Article 3 of the Universal Declaration states: "Everyone has the right to life,
liberty, and security of person." Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
125 See ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 6(1) ("Every human being has the inherent right
to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
life.).
126 Schabas, supra note 122, at 419.

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 82:12

period. 127 The language of the ICCPR on the question of the death
penalty reflected this parallel movement and suggested a program toward abolition. Thus, while outright abolition was not achievable
when negotiations over the ICCPR began, by the time the ICCPR entered into force in 1976, support for full abolition had grown. In addition to protecting arbitrary deprivations of life, the ICCPR provides:
In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in
accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of
the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant .. . and can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment

2s
rendered by a competent court.'
The U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 2857 in 1971,
which called for restricting the crimes for which the death penalty
would be available and recognized progressive abolition as a goal.1 29
International campaigns to abolish the death penalty stepped up
in the 1980s. In 1989, the Convention on the Rights of the Child was
adopted, outlawing the death penalty for persons below the age of
eighteen. 130 (The United States has not ratified the Convention, but
its provisions were discussed by the Court in the Roper case.13 1 ) Also
in 1989, Amnesty International published its groundbreaking survey
and analysis of the death penalty, Wen the State Kills.13 2 Amnesty reported that only thirty-five countries were abolitionist for all crimes;
an additional eighteen countries were abolitionist for ordinary crimes;
another twenty-seven retained capital punishment on the books but
were abolitionist in practice. One hundred countries retained and
carried out the death penalty for ordinary crimes. The majority of
states continued to employ capital punishment, but momentum ap33
peared to be in the direction of abolition.'

127 See Koh, supra note 62, at 1094-95 (discussing the "de facto moratorium on the
death penalty that took effect throughout most of Western Europe" in the post-war
period).
128 ICCPR, supra note 24, art. 6(2).
129 G.A. Res. 2857, U.N. GAOR, 26th Sess., Supp. No. 29, at 94, U.N. Doc. A/8429
(Dec. 20, 1971).
130 Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37(a), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S.
3 (prohibiting executions for crimes committed under the age of eighteen).
131 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 576 (2005).

132

AMNESTY INT'L., WHEN THE STATE KILLS

(1989).

133 Schabas, supra note 122, at 421 (discussing Mhen the State Kills and noting that
"with each decade subsequent to 1948, the number of states abolishing capital punishment increased").
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Formal legal efforts culminated with the adoption of Optional
13 4
Protocol 2 to the ICCPR in 1991, which banned the death penalty.
In addition, protocols to the European Convention on Human
Rights

35

and the American Convention on Human Rights

36

also out-

lawed the death penalty. The trend toward abolition in Latin America
13 7
appeared to gain momentum even earlier than in Europe.
The death penalty continued in the United States, with the notable exception of the period between 1967 and 1977 when a de facto
moratorium on capital punishment was in place. The moratorium re38
sulted from the Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia
striking down the death penalty statutes in forty states on the grounds
that they permitted unfettered jury discretion. - 9 It was not lifted until the Gregg v. Georgia140 decision of 1976, when states reformed the
procedures and sentencing guidelines in a way the Court found to
meet constitutional minimums. 14 1 Popular support for capital punishment in the United States had waxed and waned during the first decades following World War II, reaching an all-time low of forty-two
percent in 1966, and resurging in the 1980s. 142 The resurgence was
assisted, in part, by a series of cases in which the Court laid out the
procedural protections under which the federal state could impose
death sentences and carry out executions.143 By 1989, thirty-seven
144
U.S. states retained the death penalty for ordinary crimes.
Throughout this period, the United States did not accede to any international obligations regarding limits upon capital punishment. When
134 Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights art. 1, Dec. 15, 1989, 1642 U.N.T.S. 414, 415.
135 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
art. 2, Sept. 3, 1953, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 224.
136 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art.
4, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123.
137 A U.S. delegate to the San Jose Conference of 1969, at which the American
Convention was adopted, noted "'the general trend, already apparent, for the gradual
abolition of the death penalty."' Schabas, supra note 122, at 425 (quoting OAS Doc.

OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.1, doc. 10, at 9)).
138 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
139 Id. at 239 (striking down Georgia's death penalty statute on the basis of juries'
unfettered sentencing discretion and voiding the death penalty statutes of over forty
states).

140
141
142
143
death

428 U.S. 153 (1976).
Id. at 206-07 (reinstating the death penalty).
Koh, supra note 62, at 1095.
See, e.g., id. at 1099-1102 (analyzing U.S. Supreme Court cases dealing with the
penalty to illustrate how the death penalty gained new life in the 1980s).

144

Death Penalty Information Center, State by State Information, http://www.

deathpenaltyinfo.org/state (last visited Oct. 14, 2006).
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the United States did finally accede to the ICCPR in 1993, it did so
with reservations to every aspect of the treaty that would require it to
give the treaty provisions direct effect in U.S. courts and also limited
U.S. obligations regarding the death penalty to those that would be
14
required under the Eighth Amendment. 5
What caused this international norm shift in the 1 990s? The End
of the Cold War was an important catalyst. First, the end of the EastWest conflict promoted newly democratizing states to join western institutions and "lock-in" western human rights norms. The European
Human Rights Convention was amended to abolish the death penalty
in 1985.146 The states of the former Warsaw Pact, with an eye to joining the European Union, were anxious to sign on to commitments to
the central human rights instruments of Europe that would serve as
entry into the club.
Second, just as the trend in Europe and elsewhere was toward
reinvigorating the possibility of real enforcement of core international
human rights norms, the United States seemed to be going backward,
taking a "law and order" attitude at home and an "exceptionalist" attitude abroad. Even Bill Clinton, during his campaign for the presidency in 1992, took time out to preside over the execution of a
mentally impaired death row inmate in Arkansas. 1 47 It cannot be
overestimated the extent to which American exceptionalism on capital punishment was a stone in the shoe of American global diplomacy.' 48 European allies, in particular, freed from the relational
constraints of the Cold War, were increasingly emboldened to con149
front the United States on this issue.
145 See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 399, 417 (2000).
146 See Protocol No. 6 to the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death
Penalty art. 1, opened for signature Apr. 28, 1983, Europ. T.S. No. 114 (entered into
force March 1, 1985).
147 See Christopher Olgiati, The Whitehouse Via Death Row, THE GJARDiAN, Features
p.18 (Oct. 12, 1993).
148 See Harold Hongju Koh & Thomas R. Pickering, American Diplomacy and the
Death Penalty, FoRErGN SERV. J., Oct. 2003, at 19; Schabas, supra note 122, at 434 (noting international disagreements between the United Nations and the European
Union on one side and the United States on the other).
149 One example of these efforts was a 2001 symposium sponsored by the Council
of Europe and the Pan-European parliament aimed at a worldwide moratorium.
Texas was invited and attended part of the conference. John Quigley, International
Attention to the Death Penalty: Texas as a Lightning Rod, 8 TEx. J. C.L. & C.R. 175, 176
(2003).
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At the same time, international and domestic NGOs had a window of opportunity to leverage both these trends-the momentum
created by new states signing on to the major international and regional human rights treaties and the willingness of European states to
confront the United States. International organizations also played a
role by monitoring ongoing compliance with obligations and reporting on the persistent objectors like the United States and China. Because the United States had not obligated itself to a ban, these reports
tended to focus on the problems with fair application of the death
penalty in the United States. 150 Together with the work of domestic
abolition groups and legal organizations such as the ABA, a body of
empirical data was compiled suggesting that the death penalty in the
United States was applied disproportionately to African-Americans,
15 1
other minority groups, the poor, and the mentally impaired.
The trend toward abolition gained significant momentum in the
early 1990s. Since 1991, over fifty countries have acceded to Optional
Protocol 2; seventy countries are now bound by their accession to international treaties banning the death penalty in all cases. Among the
countries that have not adopted a total ban, eleven countries limit the
death penalty to extreme crimes such as genocide, war crimes, and
150 The 1997 Report of U.N. Human Rights Commission Special Rapporteur Waly
Ndiaye stated:
[I] remain[ ] deeply concerned that death sentences continue to be
handed down after trials which allegedly fall short of the international guarantees for a fair trial, including lack of adequate defence during the trials
and appeals procedures. [Areas of special concern are] the imposition and
application of the death penalty on persons reported to be mentally retarded or mentally ill.... [and] those cases which were allegedly tainted by
racial bias on the part of the judges or prosecution and about the nonmandatory nature of the appeals procedure after conviction in capital cases
in some states.
The Special Rapporteur, The Report of the Special Rapporteuron the Question of the Violation of Human Rights and FundamentalFreedoms in Any Part of the World, with Particular
Reference to Colonial and Other Dependent Countries and Territories,para. 551, delivered to
the Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1997/60/ADD.1 (Dec. 24, 1996).
151 Elizabeth Olson, U.N. Report Criticizes U.S. for "Racist" Use of Death Penalty, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 7, 1998, at A17; see also David C. Baldus et al., RacialDiscriminationand the
Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findingsfrom Philadelphia,83 CORNELL L. REv. 1638, 1651 (1998) ("'While blacks make up
only thirteen percent of the nation's civilian population, blacks make up forty-one
percent of the nation's death row population."); Stephen B. Bright, Discrimination,
Death, and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial Discriminationin Infliction of the Death Penalty,
35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 433, 434 (1995) (noting that a study of the death sentencing
in Harris County, Texas, "which has carried out more executions and sentenced more
people to death than most states," found that blacks were sent to death row nearly
twice as often as whites).
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high treason.1 52 The death penalty persists on the books and in practice in China, the Middle East, most parts of central and eastern Africa, and the English-speaking Caribbean.' l
Sixty-three countries
share the de jure U.S. position of retaining capital punishment for a
range of ordinary crimes, down from 100 in 1989.154 Of those countries, however, fewer than thirty have actually carried out executions
in the past decade. 155 During 2004, 3,797 people were executed in
twenty-five countries.1 5 6 Thus, with the prominent exceptions of
China, Iran, Vietnam and the United States, which together account
for 97% of the executions carried out in a year, the international
trend since 1990 has been toward both de facto and de jure abolition.' 5 7 Thirty-seven of the fifty U.S. states retain the death penalty, as
58
do the U.S. federal government and military.'
In the meantime, abolition has become the norm in the administration of international and transitional justice. The death penalty
was not permitted as punishment under the 1994 statutes of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) or the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 59 nor is it per160
mitted under the Rome Statue of the International Criminal Court.
In 2003, during the U.S. occupation of Iraq, Paul Bremer signed a
Coalition Provisional Authority decree suspending capital punishment
in Iraq.' 6 1 The death penalty was reinstated by the Iraqi government
152 Amnesty Int'l, Facts and Figures on the Death Penalty, http://web.amnesty.
org/pages/deathpenalty-facts-eng (last visited Oct. 14, 2006).
153 See id.
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 Press Release, Amnesty Int'l, Death Penalty: 3,797 Executed in 2004 (Apr. 5,
2005), http://news.amnesty.org/index/ENGACT500112005 Those countries were
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Belarus, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Jordan, North Korea, Kuwait, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Taiwan, Tajikistan, United States, Uzbekistan, Vietnam and Yemen. This
represents a downward trend in de facto execution rates. See Eric Prokosch, Human
Rights v. The Death Penalty: Abolition and Restriction in Law and Practice,AMNESTy INT'L,
May 13, 1998, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGACT500131998.
157 Id.
158 Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 144.
159 See Amnesty Int'l, The Death Penalty Questions and Answers, at 2, http://www.
amnestyusa.org/abolish/dp-qa.pdf (last visited Oct. 14, 2006).
160 See Amnesty Int'l, InternationalCiminal Court Excludes Death Penalty, DEATH P N.
ALrx NEWS, Sept. 1998, available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGACT
530041998.
161 Coalition Provisional Order No. 7 (CPA/ORD/9June 2003/07) § 3(1) (2003),
available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20030610-CPAORD-7-PenalCode.pdf.
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after the transfer of sovereignty from the CPA, and is an available punishment for convictions of the Iraqi Special Tribunal. 62 Abolition has
not yet become a norm of customary international law, which requires
both consistent state practice and compliance with the practice out of
6
a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris).' 3
For states that are parties to these international abolitionist obligations, the illegality and immorality of the death penalty is a settled
matter. The persistence of the death penalty as a practice of a handful of states is thus seen by abolitionist states as an obstacle to be overcome. In this way, the abolitionist movement reflects the dimension
of the international human rights regime in which states care about
the practices of other states. Abolitionist states take seriously their obligations not only to live up to the abolitionist standard, but to take
efforts to bring objecting states into the abolitionist fold, including
employing persuasion and coercion. Coercion is reflected through
the conditioning of membership or access to other club goods (such
as trade concessions or foreign aid) or direct retaliation by the use of
economic or security sanctions. The art of state persuasion can be
carried out through traditional diplomatic dialogue, the use of information, and the invocation of liberal values.
The difficulty with American exceptionalism on the death penalty
is that, as the richest and most powerful nation in the world, coercion
is not a viable option for individual states. Moreover, attempts to act
as a block against the United States, as in the case of the EU, proves a
difficult collective action problem. The federal system of the United
States creates an additional obstacle to interstate coercion or persuasion. Many of the diplomatic counterparts at the national level may
be sympathetic to appeals to international abolitionist standards. But
the laws under which the death penalty is carried out and enforced
are, for the most part, laws of U.S. states.
Abolitionist states therefore required both a way to leverage their
individual objection to the death penalty practices of the United
States and a means of entry into the state and federal legal systems in
which capital sentences are sought, handed down, and enforced.
Consular notification and assistance would prove a relatively robust
method through which to accomplish both objectives.

162 See Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal art. 27, Dec. 10, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 231.
163 Yet preeminent abolitionists see the trend of treaty accession and practice as
suggesting that this ripening into custom may occur in the near future. Schabas,
supra note 122, at 419.
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THE CONSULAR FUNCTION AS NORM MEDIATOR

The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations was drafted and
ratified to codify the customary international law that had grown up
over centuries of consular practice. Since the very first days of the
Republic, the United States has participated in the practice of sending
and receiving consuls, and the protection of the welfare and well-being of nationals has a long tradition as part of the consular function. 164 In contrast to diplomats, consular officers are not empowered
to deal with interstate political matters. 16 5 Rather, consuls traditionally have been envoys serving in a foreign state or territory for the
purpose of protecting the direct commercial interests of the sending
state. This traditional role of consuls marchand (commercial consuls)
included within it the legal protection of individual nationals of the
sending state who might find themselves in a foreign territory in order
166
to carry out commerce.
The traditional view evolved over time, particularly as transportation methods advanced and personal and temporary business travel to
foreign states became easier' 67 Among the modern duties of a consular officer are the issuing of passports to nationals and visas to nonnationals seeking to visit the sending state, performing legal functions
such as notarizing documents and assisting nationals who find themselves in distress while overseas.' 6s Prior to the adoption of the VCCR
as a multilateral treaty, bilateral consular conventions predominated. 16 9 By the 1950s, bilateral treaties commonly recognized consu164

For a history of the consular function during the first 130 years of the United

States, see CHARLES STUART

KENNEDY,

THE AMERICAN

CONSUL

(1990).

165 Diplomats may sometimes serve concurrently as consuls, in which case they
carry out political functions along with commercial and protective functions.
166 See LUKE T. LEE, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE 124 (2d ed. 1991).
167 See id. (noting that the traditional consular function of protection "has assumed growing importance as more and more people travel abroad-aided by reduced barriers to movement, cheaper transport, and the tourist and package-travel
industry").
168 The nature of the American consular service changed after World War I. See
KENNEDY, supra note 164, at 223 (noting how the duties of consuls changed during
WWI after they started to "oversee the evacuation of Americans from the war zone in
Europe, report on the fast-moving political and military developments, and represent
one or another of the belligerents as the neutral protecting power prior to the U.S.
entry into the war in 1917"). See generally U.S. Department of State, The Bureau of
ConsularAffairs, OurMission,http://travel.state.gov/about/mission/mission_307.html
(last visited Oct. 14, 2006) (describing the duties of the Bureau of Consular Affairs:
issuing passports, providing support to U.S. citizens abroad, and issuing visas).
169 The United States was a party to twenty-two separate bilateral conventions
prior to adoption of the VCCR. Victor M. Uribe, Consuls at Work: UniversalInstruments
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by accused foreigners," 17 5 which can include unfamiliarity with the
foreign language and legal system. Consular notification is also
viewed as an important measure to prevent maltreatment of a detainee. When they are in the power and physical custody of a foreign
state, nationals may be most at risk of torture or inhuman treatment,
"for which ex post facto remedies are scarcely adequate." 176 A right of
access of third parties to persons in detention became viewed as an
important deterrent to such mistreatment. 177 Indeed, consular notification has frequently been considered important to ensure not just
adequate treatment, but, in fact, better treatment than an individual
detainee would otherwise receive in the foreign system. 78 In the case
of disparate legal systems, the consular function serves to mediate between a mature criminal justice system (that of the sending state) and
a less mature foreign legal system with fewer general procedural protections or fewer protections for foreigners in which the national of
the sending state would be particularly vulnerable to unfair or une79
qual treatment.1
175 S. Adele Shank & John Quigley, Foreigners on Texas's Death Row and the Right of
Access to a Consul, 26 ST. MARY's L.J. 719, 721 (1995); see also Uribe, supra note 169, at
387 ("Consular functions aim to protect the interests of the sending state and its
nationals.").
176 See Shank & Quigley, supra note 175, at 736; Uribe, supra note 169, at 395.
177 See Shank & Quigley, supra note 175, at 736-37.
178 Consular officers of the United States are required to visit American expatriate
prisoners on a regular basis. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CONSuAR NOTIFICATION AND
AcCESs 42 (1998) [hereinafter STATE DEP'T INSTRUCTIONS], available at http://travel.
state.gov/pdf/CNA-book.pdf (noting that an important function of the consulate is
to provide "assistance to citizens who are detained by foreign government" by "visiting
them in prison to ensure that they are receiving humane treatment" (emphasis added)).
179 1 do not mean to suggest that all mature criminal justice systems within generally democratic countries have equal levels of procedural protections. Nor do I mean
to suggest that the criminal justice systems of the developed democracies are problem
free. The point here is that the consular function traditionally mediated between the
system of the sending state and the receiving state. The notification and access provisions of the VCCR may be less compelling for a foreign national of a sending state
with an abysmal system of criminal procedural protection who finds herself in, for
example, Sweden. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 109TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HuMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 2004: SWEDEN § 1 (c)-(e) (Comm. Print 2005), available
at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41710.htm (noting that Sweden fully
complies with international protections against torture or other cruel, inhuman and
degrading treatment, has a fair and independent judiciary that guarantees fair trials,
and is a country where arbitrary arrests and detention generally do not occur). But
even Sweden, for all its advantages, is not perfect. Id. § 2(c) ("According to police
statistics, the number of reported anti-Semitic hate crimes has increased since the end
of the 1990s.").
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Already in the mid-1970s, the United States articulated its support
of these rationales for the notification provision of the VCCR. Article
36 was specifically cited as an essential tool for effective protection of
U.S. citizens abroad, one which served as a deterrent (though by no
means a perfect one) against abuse in countries with little to no protection from abuse within their criminal justice systems.18 0 Among
the particular concerns of the United States was the danger of coerced statements during detention.181 Arbitrary or draconian application of the death penalty-particularly for less severe crimes which the
United States did not consider warranting capital punishment (for example, drug smuggling) also raised the need for early consular notification. The United States viewed the necessary leverage for protesting
bad practices and ultimately protecting individuals as emanating from
the early consular or diplomatic (i.e., political) intervention afforded
by notification. Diplomatic or political intervention is carried out almost exclusively by the Executive, but at least one recent high-profile
1 82
case involved direct intervention by a Senator.
Consular notification thus holds out the promise of subsequent
extra protection of diplomacy and political interference. Although it
is never explicitly discussed in the legal analysis of the consular function, diplomatic interference is the dimension that is most salient to
Americans when they travel overseas. In the event of a miscarriage of
justice, many Americans believe that their own government will go to
extreme measures, throwing its reputation and clout behind their
cause until justice is served.' 8 3 Despite the occasional well-publicized
180 See U.S. Citizens Imprisoned in Mexico: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on International, Political,and MilitaryAffairs, Part 2, 94th Cong. 6 (1975) (statement of Leonard
F. Walentynowicz, U.S. Dep't of State) (stating that "a particular issue of prime importance is that of denied or delayed consular access," and that "[w]ith early access to
each prisoner we are convinced we can go a long way toward guaranteeing the prisoner against mistreatment and forced statements at the time of arrest" (emphasis added)).
181 Id.
182 Article 11 of the U.S. Constitution notes that the President shall receive ambassadors and consuls. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 3. The House and Senate often become involved in high-profile cases. See, e.g., S. Res. 148, 104th Cong., 141 CONG. REC.
18063-64 (1995) (discussing the arrest of Harry Wu, an American citizen and human
rights activist arrested on political charges in China). Releases of American citizens
held on political charges have been secured after sustained diplomatic pressure. See
Elisabeth Rosenthal, China Frees U.S. Citizen Held Since April on Spy Charges, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 29. 2001, at A4; see also Jeff Leeds & Sharon Waxman, For a Music Maker in Hot
Water, Help From Friends in High Places, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2006, at Al, B13 (detailing
the intervention of Senator Orrin Hatch to help secure the release of music producer
Dallas Austin from jail in Dubai, where he had been arrested for cocaine possession).
183 For an early example of where this did happen, see Meade v. United States, 76
U.S. 691, 693 (1869) (discussing the imprisonment in Spain of U.S. citizen Richard
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successful interventions, they are, in reality, the least likely outcome
for average Americans charged with ordinary crimes overseas, even
where the sentence for that crime might be harsher than it would be
8
in the United States.1

4

The rationales for notification and access went beyond these
practical considerations. The VCCR entered into force during a time
of increased legalization of international human rights. The aspirational goals of the U.N. Charter'8 5 and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 18 6 which set standards of treatment of individuals,

were supplemented by more formal human rights agreements such as
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) ,187
the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR),' 8 8 the Inter-American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man,189 and the European Convention on Human Rights Charter. 90 These human rights instruments included provisions
protecting individuals facing criminal prosecution and also required
nondiscrimination on the basis of nationality. 9 1 Through incorporation into these multilateral human rights instruments, the fair treatment of foreign nationals by one state became a concern not just of
the national's home state acting under its sovereign prerogative to extend protection to its citizens overseas, but of all members of the international community. Indeed, the codification of notification and
access under Article 36 of the VCCR was explicitly seen by some delegates to the VCCR conference as part of the broader project to enumerate and codify human rights protections. The delegate from
Greece, for example, noted that by incorporating the right of notificaMeade in 1816 who was "finally released only by reason of the active interposition of
the government of the United States in his behalf").
184 See, e.g., 48 Hours Mystery: Lori Berenson Speaks, (CBS television broadcast Oct.
19, 2000), available at http://cbsnews.com/stories/2000/10/18/48hours/main2421
75.shtml (describing the background of Lori Berenson, an American sentenced to life
in a Peruvian prison after being convicted of involvement with a terrorist group).
185 U.N. Charter art. 1.
186 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 124.
187 ICCPR, supra note 24.
188 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, adopted Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5 (entered into forceJan. 3, 1976).
189 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, O.A.S.
Official Rec., OEA/Ser./L./V./I.23, doc. 21 rev. 6.
190 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
supra note 135, art. 6, 213 U.N.T.S. 228; id. art. 14, 213 U.N.T.S. 232.
191 See, e.g.,
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supra note 135, arts. 1-14, 213 U.N.T.S. at 224-32; ICCPR, supra note 24,
arts. 24, 26.
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tion and access into the treaty, the conference was "following the present-day trend of promoting and protecting human rights, for which
92
future generations would be grateful."'
In 1985, the U.N. General Assembly adopted "The Declaration
on the Human Rights of Individuals who are not Nationals of the
Country in which They Live,"'19 which provides, in part, that "laIny
alien shall be free at any time to communicate with the consulate or
1 94
diplomatic mission of the State of which he or she is a national."
This declaration merged the norm of nondiscrimination against foreign nationals found in the central human rights treaties with the notification provisions of the VCCR and customary international law. As
a General Assembly resolution, the Declaration is not binding as a
matter of international law, but it succeeds in refraining the notification right as one of an individual right of the foreign national. By
reading the declaration together with the VCCR, it is possible to conclude, as Warbrick did, that the "interest of the individual in consular
protection is, in some of its aspects, a personal right and not a matter
195
of concern only to the two States."
By the late 1980s, the notification and assistance requirement of
Article 36 became viewed as supplemented by other international
human rights standards, in particular, by ICCPR Article 14, which details the criminal procedure protections owed individuals. The ICCPR
thus served to give content to the rights understood to constitute the
"international minimum standard" of treatment required for foreign
nationals. 196 This view of the consular function thus signaled a subtle
shift from the traditional view as mediating between two sovereignsi.e., between the legal system of the sending state and that of the receiving state-toward mediation between an international standard
and that of the receiving state.
Despite the practical and human rights-based rationales of consular intervention that underlie the notification and access provisions, as
Warbrick notes, "nowhere is there an indication that the individual
192 See 1 U.N. Conference on Consular Relations, 2d Comm., 17th mtg. at 339,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 25/16 (Mar. 15, 1963) (remarks of the Greek delegate, Mr.
Spyridakis).
193 G.A. Res. 40/144, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (Dec. 13, 1985). The General Assembly
later adopted standards applicable to all individuals facing detention. Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment,
G.A. Res. 43/173, U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (Dec. 9, 1988).
194 G.A. Res. 40/144, supra note 193, art. 10.
195 Warbrick, supra note 174, at 1004.
196 Id. (citing Geoffrey Marston, United Kingdom Materials on International Law
1986, 57 BrT. Y.B. INT'L L. 487, 605 (1986)).
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has a right to demand that his consulate takes steps to visit him and
secure services for him."' 9 7 Rather, to the extent that an individual
right is created by the notification and access requirement, it is a right
fully contingent on the decision of the sending state to maintain a
consular presence and also the willingness or ability of the consul of
the sending state to accept the notification and render assistance. It
cannot, for example, be compared to the right to counsel in the
United StatesA 98 Unlike the provision of counsel in the oft-recited
Miranda statement, if a consul is not available, none will be provided
to the foreign detainee. 19 9 Consular representation-and thus the intervention on which the rationales for notification are premised-remains an expression of the sovereign prerogatives of the sending
state .200

B. Enforcement and Remedies
Given the contingent nature of the right, it is thus not terribly
surprising that state signatories barely contemplated the possibility of
a judicial remedy in cases of a failure to notify. Judicial enforcement
of individual rights created under the VCCR is not directly mentioned
20 1
in the travaux prparatoires(negotiating history) of the Convention.
The U.S. State Department's view was that enforcement of the rights
and obligations created under the treaty rested primarily with the
197 Id.
198 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (deciding that indigent
defendant in a criminal prosecution has the right to have counsel appointed to him
or her).
199 In practice, this can be a real problem for nationals of poor countries who find
themselves in countries with little or no consular representation.
200 Several countries have adopted national legislation that requires their consular
22 U.S.C. § 1732 (2000) ("Whenever it is made
officers to render assistance. See, e.g.,
known to the President that any citizen of the United States has been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or under the authority of any foreign government, it shall be the
duty of the President forthwith to demand of that government the reasons of such imprisonment; and if it appears to be wrongful and in violation of the rights of American citizenship, the President shall forthwith demand the release of such citizen, and if the
release so demanded is unreasonably delayed or refused, the President shall use such
means, not amounting to acts of war and not otherwise prohibited by law, as he may
think necessary and proper to obtain or effectuate the release .

.

. ") (emphases ad-

ded); Foreign Missions and International Organizations Act, 1991 S.C., ch. 41 (Can.).
201 See Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 1 (Mar. 31),
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusjudgment/imus-imus
judgment__20040331.pdf (describing how the United States disagreed with the notion
that the VCCR required a judicial remedy for a failure of immediate notification and
that "such an understanding was supported neither by the terminology, nor by the
object and purpose of the Vienna Convention, nor by its travaux priparatoires").
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partment of'Justice and the military had adopted consular notification
guidelines prior to the VCCR and updated them subsequent to the
adoption of the VCCR. 209 None of these regulations provided specifically for judicial review, beyond what would otherwise be available
through the administrative review process.2 10 At the state and municipal level, there was a general lack of administrative guidance on the
notification provisions for law enforcement personnel. Police training
on procedures did not include training on the VCCR.2 1t State and
local police forces thus operated in blissful ignorance of the require21 2
ment, with the result that noncompliance was widespread.
The Optional Protocol of the VCCR did, however, provide for the
adjudication of interstate disputes arising between state signatories
before the ICJ. Until the Breardcase in 1998,213 jurisdiction of the ICJ
to decide a case under the VCCR had been invoked only once, in the
case of the taking of American hostages in Tehran in 1979.214 Currently, 172 states are signatories to the VCCR.2 15 And yet there have
been only four applications, including Breard, brought under the Op-

contrast, the U.K. by the mid-1990s had "issued instructions to police that detained
foreigners, regardless of their states of nationality, 'may communicate at any time'
with their consulate and that they must be asked if they wish the police to inform their
consulate of their detention." Id. at 738 (citation omitted).
209 See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 50.5 (1999); see also Mark Warren, Consular Notification:
Statutory and Regulatory Provisions, July 2006, http://www3.sympatico.ca/aiwarren/
compliance.htm (referencing a 1983 FBI manual).
210 See 8 CFR § 242.2(e) (1979); Shank & Quigley, supra note 175, at 738.
211 Shank & Quigley, supra note 175, at 739. To be sure, police and law enforcement officials permitted detainees to contact someone. Detainees who were aware of
the right to consular access could contact their consulates and police did not generally interfere with those subsequent contacts and communications. Id. But it was no
substitute for the police informing the foreign national of the right, which may have
the additional value of placating any fears on the part of the detainee that contact
with the consulate would be construed as hostile by the police. Id.
212 See id. at 748.
213 See infra Part IV.B.4.i. (discussing Breard).
214 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980
I.C.J. 3, paras. 45-47, at 24-26 (May 24).
215 See VCCR, supra note 2, art. 79.

2006]

NORM

PORTALS

tional Protocol to challenge state violations of the VCCR. 216 Each of
21 7
these cases raised Article 36 concerns.
Enforcement of the VCCR was therefore largely carried out
through classic interstate diplomacy. Violations of the treaty typically
were raised by the sending state to the foreign ministry of the receiving state through formal channels, such as presentation of a diplomatic note. 21 8 For the United States, monitoring of compliance with
the notification provision abroad, for example, was and continues to
be carried out by State Department representatives. 21 9 Similarly, foreign states with consular representation in the United States typically
lodge their complaints with the Department of State. 220 To the extent
that the State Department provides a "remedy" for failure of enforcement by federal, state or local law enforcement authorities, it might be
through a formal apology and assurance to the foreign state that steps
22 1
would be taken to ensure compliance in the future.
Given the view of the signatory states that, while the notification
requirement serves to protect individuals, it can only be enforced between states, it is not surprising that few individual VCCR claims were
raised in U.S. courts in the first two decades the treaty was in force.
Between 1966 and 1994, the VCCR was directly invoked in only
nineteen reported state and federal cases; none of them raised a claim
216 See, e.g., Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998); Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 1.C.J. 1 (Mar. 31), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/
icjwww/idocket/imus/imusjudgment/imusimusjudgment-20040331 .pdf; LaGrand
Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27); U.S. Staff in Iran, 1980 I.C.J. 3. The
ICJ has also addressed individual rights under a bilateral consular treaty. See Rights of
Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (Fr. v. U.S.), 1952 I.CJ. 176, at
178 (Aug. 27).
217 See Breard, 523 U.S. at 376; Avena, 2004 I.C.J. at 17 (noting how "Mexico based
the jurisdiction of the Court on Article 36"); LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. at 470 ("Germany
based the jurisdiction of the Court on Article 36."); U.S. Staff in Iran, 1980 I.C.J. at 6
(noting that the U.S. government requested that the ICJ "adjudge and declare as
follows: ... that the Government ... of Iran... violated its international legal obligations to the United States as provided by . .. Articles 5 [and] 36").
218 See LEE, supra note 166, at 93-95.
219 See M. Wesley Clark, ProvidingConsularRights Warnings to Foreign Nationals, FBI
L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., March 2002, at 22, 25, (citing 28 C.F.R. § 50.5(a) (1), (a) (3)
(2006)), available at http://www.fbi.gov/puhlications/leb/2002/marO2leb.pdf. Clark
notes that while 28 C.F.R. § 50.5 discusses consular notification in cases of arrest, it
fails to require that notification be made in the case of detention not constituting
arrest. See also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-2.173
(2005).
220 See LEE, supra note 166, at 62-63; STATE DEP'T INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 178, at
18.
221 Counter-Memorial of the U.S., supra note 204, para. 50; see infra Part IV.C.
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under Article 36.222 Several cases were, however, brought under the
Immigration and Naturalization Service regulations governing deportation of foreign nationals. 22 3 In one of those cases, the court held
222 Many of these cases considered questions of consular immunity. Federal cases:
Gerritsen v. Consulado General De Mexico, 989 F.2d 340, 346 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that consul and vice-consul were entitled to immunity under VCCR in § 1983
claim); Risk v. Halvorsen, 936 F.2d 393, 398 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining that VCCR
provides consular officials with immunity in a suit brought by a father whose children
were taken to Norway in violation of a U.S. court order); Gerritsen v. de la Madrid
Hurtado, 819 F.2d 1511, 1519 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that wrongful acts committed
by officials and employees were not consular functions and so did not qualify for
immunity under VCCR); DuPree v. United States, 559 F.2d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 1977)
(holding that consul did not have standing to intervene under VCCR in a suit filed by
Mexican nationals against United States); United States v. Wilburn, 497 F.2d 946, 948
(5th Cir. 1974) (holding that under VCCR, vice consul can be called as a witness and
to elect to testify or produce requested documents); Heaney v. Gov't of Spain, 445
F.2d 501, 505-06 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding that consul should be granted immunity
under VCCR in civil action based on a public act concerning diplomatic activity);
Ford v. Clement, 834 F. Supp. 72, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (granting immunity to consulgeneral under VCCR in defamation suit by former vice-consul); United States v. Cole,
717 F. Supp. 309, 323-24 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that consul-general was not entided to immunity under VCCR for money laundering); Koeppel & Koeppel v. Fed.
Republic of Nigeria, 704 F. Supp. 521, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that consul was
immune from suit for providing a foreign national with refuge after he allegedly
started a fire). State cases: In re Stephanie M., 867 P.2d 706, 712-13 (Cal. 1994) (raising notice requirement in guardianship cases under the VCCR); People v. Corona,
259 Cal. Rptr. 524, 531-32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (finding that defendant not entitled
to post-conviction relief for improper admission of consul testimony without waiver of
consular immunity privilege); Silva v. Super. Ct., 125 Cal. Rptr. 78, 86 (Cal. Ct. App.
1975) (holding that consul only afforded immunity for official consular matters); Ill.
Commerce Comm'n v. Salamie, 369 N.E.2d 235, 237 (Il1. App. Ct. 1977) (forcing
honorary consul for another nation to testify to matters not in relation to his functions as honorary consul); Commonwealth v. Jerez, 457 N.E.2d 1105, 1109 (Mass.
1983) (holding that consular officer was immune under VCCR for altercation that
occurred during exercise of consular functions); Republic of Argentina v. City of New
York, 250 N.E.2d 698, 704 (N.Y. 1969) (exempting premises owned by foreign consul
from municipal real-estate taxes); Cocron v. Cocron, 375 N.Y.S.2d 797, 805 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1975) (holding that consular officials are only immune from civil suits in relation
to official consular matters). For a rare pre-VCCR case on consular notification, see
United States v. Coplon, 89 F. Supp. 664, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) (examining a pre-trial
motion challenging unreasonable delay in providing consular notification).
223 See, e.g., United States v. Ibarra, 3 F.3d 1333, 1335 (9th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Zaleta-Sosa, 854 F.2d 48, 52 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Cerda-Pena, 799
F.2d 1374, 1379 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Arambula-Alvarado, 677 F.2d 51, 52
(9th Cir. 1982); Tejeda-Mata v. INS, 626 F.2d 721, 726 (9th Cir. 1980); United States
v. Bejar-Matrecios, 618 F.2d 81, 82 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hernandez-Rojas,
617 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Vega-Mejia, 611 F.2d 751, 752 (9th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Arango-Chairez, 875 F. Supp. 609, 616 (D. Neb. 1994);
United States v. Floulis, 457 F. Supp. 1350, 1355 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
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that the INS regulation-not the treaty itself-created a personal
right.

22 4

The original purpose of the consular function, reflecting the desire to strengthen the sovereign prerogative of the sending state to
choose to protect its nationals and mediate between the legal system
of the receiving state and the home country, or to choose not to protect its nationals at all, was preserved and strengthened by the VCCR
regime. The extent to which the VCCR could serve to mediate between the legal system in which a foreign national found himself and
the norms of external systems (whether international or that of the
sending state) was limited by confining remedies to interstate dispute
resolution. The effectiveness of outside consular intervention to alter
legal outcomes in particular cases depended as much on the political
power of the sending state vis-A-vis the receiving state as it did on the
legal requirements of the convention. But by the 1990s, the increased
legalization of the international human rights regime, combined with
the trend toward the abolition of the death penalty, resulted in a new,
more robust VCCR notification requirement that could be exploited
by transnational advocacy support networks to affect the actual outcomes in capital cases of foreign nationals.
IV.

DEFENDANT "ZERO" AND THE NoRM CASCADE

This evolution of consular notification as an expression of sovereign prerogative and a mechanism of mediation between two legal
systems to its use as a formal portal through which external human
rights norms could enter into a legal system, be elaborated, considered, and ultimately affect outcomes in particular cases, required a
defendant "zero." That initial defendant would be the first foreign
national to raise the claim of a judicially cognizable individual right
arising from the notification provision of VCCR and challenge the denial of consular notification as an infringement on protections from
arbitrary and unfair application of the death penalty.
The first case brought under the Article 36 notification provisions
of the VCCR was not a criminal case. In United States v. Calderon-Medina,22 5 the INS detained a Mexican national for deportation on the
grounds that his immigration status was irregular. The INS failed to
224 United States v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d 529, 532-33 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting
that "[t]he right established by the regulation and in this case by treaty is a personal
one," while emphasizing "the purpose of the treaty which the [INS] regulation implements, namely to promote assistance to aliens from officials of their country of
origin").
225 591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979).
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inform the Mexican national of his right, under INS regulations, to
have the consulate notified of his detention and ordered him deported. The Mexican national appealed the order on the basis of the
failure to notify him of his right to contact the consulate. On remand
back from the Ninth Circuit for a determination of facts, 22 6 the district court held that the deportation was not precluded by due process. In a companion case, the Ninth Circuit set forth a test for
nullification of deportation orders where there was a failure to notify
under the regulations implementing Article 36: "(1) the man did not
know of his right to contact a consul; (2) he would have contacted a
consul had he known of his right; and (3) consular assistance might
have improved his chance of avoiding deportation." 227 On the evidence before it, the court voided the deportation order. While this
case was not brought in a capital case, the reasoning of the court
would prove important to later claims.
A.

Faulderv. State228

Defendant "zero" was a Canadian national named Joseph Stanley
Faulder. 229 Faulder was convicted in Texas state court of a murder
that took place in 1975 and was sentenced to death. 230 At the time of
his arrest, he was not notified of his right to contact the Canadian
consulate. 23 1 Significantly, Faulder presented no mitigating evidence
during the penalty phase of his trial.2 5 2 In September 1991, Sandra
226 Id. at 532.
227 Shank & Quigley, supra note 175, at 731 (citing Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d at
533) (discussing disposition of Calderon-Medinaon remand from court of appeals).
228 81 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 1996).
229 For a description of the case from his defense counsel, see Babcock, supra note
62, at 374-77. See also Mark Warren, Foreword to YINC-JEN Lo, HUMAN RIGHTS LTIGATION PROMOTING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN U.S. CouRTs, at xiii-xiv (2005). Warren is a
Canadian volunteer for Amnesty International who assisted Sandra Babcock in the
Faulder defense. Babcock, supra note 62, at 377 n.37. He is also the creator and
author of the Web resource Foreign Nationals, Consular Assistance and the Death
Penalty, http://www3.sympatico.ca/aiwarren/.
230 Faulder,81 F.3d at 517. Among the procedural twists and turns of Faulder's
case was a reversal of his first conviction by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on
the basis that the admission of Faulder's confession taken in violation of the Fifth
Amendment was in error. Id. at 517 (citing Faulder v. State, 611 S.W.2d 630 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1979)). The second conviction was obtained through testimonial evidence of an accomplice. Id.
231 Babcock, supra note 62, at 375. Canada maintained a consulate in Dallas, just
hours from the place of Faulder's incarceration.
232 His attorneys would later claim that mitigating testimony would have been
available, had his family even been aware of the legal proceeding against him. Id.
But the State of Texas maintained that Faulder did not want to contact his Canadian
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sion on Human Rights (IACHR) challenging the failure of the United
States to provide a remedy for the VCCR violation.2 4 1 The Commission issued a provisional measure requesting that Texas delay the execution of Santana pending hearing the case. Texas did not stay the
execution, and Santana was executed as scheduled in 1993.242 Al-

though the decision in Santanawas reached prior to the adjudication
of the claim in Faulder,because Santana was not believed to be a foreign national at the time of his arrest, his case represented a kind of
false start.
In Faulder, Babcock raised the VCCR claim in a collateral federal
case seeking habeas corpus relief. 243 Texas admitted that the Cana24 4
dian consulate had not been notified at the time of Faulder's arrest.

In reviewing the district court's denial of habeas relief, the Fifth Circuit held that there had, in fact, been a violation of Faulder's rights
under the VCCR, noting that the Convention "requires an arresting
government to notify a foreign national who has been arrested, imprisoned or taken into custody or detention of his right to contact his
consul," and that "Canadian regulations require the Canadian consul
'2 4 5
to obtain case-related information if requested by the arrestee."
The court nonetheless denied relief to Faulder on the basis that
"Faulder and Faulder's attorney had access to all of the information
that could have been obtained by the Canadian government," and was
therefore "merely the same as or cumulative of evidence defense
counsel had or could have obtained." 246 The Fifth Circuit denied relief and a subsequent request for rehearing en banc and the Supreme
24 7
Court denied certiorari.
241 Id., at 746-47 & n.153 (citing Individual Complaint to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights Against the United States of America on behalf of
Carlos Santana, Case 11.130, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (1993)).
242 Shank & Quigley, supra note 175, at 747 (noting that a petition to the IACHR
was also filed in Fierro v. State, 706 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)).
243 In addition to the VCCR violation, Faulder requested relief on the grounds
that the use of special, private prosecutors violated his Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, that the chief witness testified falsely in violation of the Fifth,
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, and that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel. Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 517 (5th Cir. 1996). The district court had
denied relief to Faulder, but issued the required certificate of probable cause required to appeal the denial of habeas. Id.
244 Id. at 520.
245 Id. (citing the VCCR, supra note 2).
246 Id.
247 Appellant's Brief, supranote 236, at 4. Two subsequent state habeas challenges
were brought based on the use of the private state prosecutors and the ground that
state clemency procedures violated due process. Id. at 5-6.
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In 1999, twenty-two years after Faulder was put on death row and
after two subsequent state habeas appeals were denied, 24 Faulder's
attorneys went back to federal court and brought suit under the Alien
Tort Statute (ATS) 24 9 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.250 The suit included two
claims: First, that living through nine execution dates and repeated
stays of execution amounted to psychological torture that was a violation of his constitutional rights within the meaning of § 1983 and also
represented a violation of the Torture Convention, 25 1 which is the
"law of nations" within the meaning of the ATS;2 52 and second, that
the failure of consular notification violated the VCCR and was thus
also a tort within the meaning of the ATS. 253 The first claim was dismissed on the grounds that neither § 1983 nor the ATS provided an
exception to the Anti-Injunction Act 254 restrictions on the ability of
federal courts to enjoin state proceedings. 2 55 The district court further denied Faulder's request for a temporary restraining order on
the grounds that the underlying claim of psychological torture under
the Eighth Amendment and the Torture Convention had been held
not to create grounds for relief on the basis of the psychological impact of stays of execution and the drawing out of time on death
row.2 56 The court rejected the second claim as barred by collateral
estoppel on the ground it had been actually litigated and decided in
the earlier Fifth Circuit habeas opinion.2 57 The district court noted in
dicta, however, that it disagreed with the defendant's claim that violations of the VCCR do not create an individual right.258 The court
noted that the Fifth Circuit's earlier opinion in Faulderwas premised

248
249
250
251
252

Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
Faulder v. Johnson, 99 F. Supp. 2d 774, 775 (S.D. Tex, 1999).
Convention Against Torture, supra note 25.
Faulder,99 F. Supp. 2d at 775 (quoting 28 U,S.C. § 1350).
253 Id. at 775.
254 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
255 Faulder, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 776. The court rejected Faulder's claim that his
§ 1983 claim fell within one of the expressly authorized exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act. Id. at 776-78.
256 Id. at 777 (citing White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1996)). In White, the
Fifth Circuit found that claims under both the ICCPR and the Torture Convention
would fail, in that the United States signed reservations to both treaties that limited
their protection to whatever treatment is barred by the Eighth Amendment. White, 79
F.3d at 439.
257 Fauder, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 778.
258 Id.
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on the ability to assert an individual right, 25 9 and also that the Ninth
Circuit had held that the VCCR created an individual right. 260

On June 16, 1999, the Fifth Circuit denied Faulder's appeal from
262
the district court's dismissal. 2 6' Faulder was executed the next day.
Canada had requested a list of all Canadian nationals on Texas'
death row every year of the first fourteen that Faulder was on death
row, but Faulder's name never appeared on the list.263 Once they

were informed of Faulder's incarceration and death sentence (which
they learned from Babcock in 1992), the Canadian government, public at large, and individual Canadian advocates became involved in
efforts to commute his sentence. 26 4 The federal habeas petition included affidavits and testimony from witnesses in Canada in his support, along with an amicus brief filed by the Government of
Canada. 26 5 Delegations of Canadian parliamentarians met with the
Texas Pardons Board. 266 Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy
met personally with Secretary of State Madeline Albright and requested that she intervene in the case. 267 Albright's only intervention

in the case occurred in November 1998, following one of the many
stays of Faulder's execution date, in the form of a letter to then-Governor George W. Bush in which she noted the importance of consular
notification to the protection of American citizens abroad, adding
that, while it was the position of the United States Government that
Faulder was not entitled to a judicial remedy, the circumstances of the
failure of notification in his case might warrant the political solution
of clemency relief.2 68 Bush denied clemency, but the federal govern-

259 Id.
260 Id. (citing Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 520 (5th Cir. 1996) and United
States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 170 F.3d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir. 1999)).
261 Faulder v. Johnson, 178 F.3d 741, 742 (5th Cir. 1999).
262 Death Penalty Information Center, Confirmed Foreign Nationals Executed
Since 1976, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=31&did=582#executed (last visited Oct. 14, 2006).
263 Babcock, supra note 62, at 375.
264 Id. at 375-76.
265 Id. at 375. The Canadian government had also filed briefs in support of
Faulder in his state proceedings. Id.
266 Id.
267 Id.
268 Id. at 376 (quoting Letter from Madeleine K Albright, U.S. Sec'y of State, to
George W. Bush, Governor, State of Tex. (Nov. 27, 1998)). Albright noted specifically
that over 300 Texans were incarcerated in foreign prisons in the prior calendar year.
Id.
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ment set the stage for an eventual outcome it explicitly did not sup2 69
port: judicial remedy.
Canada did not neglect the potential "vertical" legal processes
available to it. Following his final stay of execution during the pursuit
of remedies in Texas and federal court, Faulder filed a petition with
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) "arguing that
Texas had subjected him to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment"
in violation of the Torture Convention, the ICCPR and the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. 27 0 The gravamen of this

complaint is known as the "death row phenomenon," the idea that
mere presence of death row and the uncertainty of the ultimate time
2 71
of death represents a unique psychological trauma on the inmate.
The IACtHR issued precautionary measures requesting the United
States to stay the execution pending resolution of his claim. 27 2 That

2 73
request was ignored and Faulder was executed.
The press played a significant role in the nongovernmental
processes. Editorials ran in the major U.S. and Canadian papers supporting commutation of Faulder's death sentence. 274 The abolitionist
network, which has developed excellent domestic organizational capabilities, inundated the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles with over
4,000 letters supporting commutation. 275 As Faulder's attorney noted,
all of the separate and concerted governmental, NGO and private acts
that took place to prevent Faulder's execution failed in one important
regard: Texas executed Faulder.2 76 But the broader effects of the case
were felt in Canada, where public support for the death penalty

dropped following the last stay of Faulder's execution in 1998.277
269 Faulder's attorney subsequently discovered that some members of the Texas
Pardons Board had voted without reviewing the letter from Albright, which became
the basis for a challenge to the clemency decision. Id. at 377.
270 Id. at 376.
271 Carol S. Steiker, No, CapitalPunishment Is Not Morally Required: Deterrence, Deontology, and the Death Penalty, 58 STAN. L. REV. 751, 766 n.147 (2005).
272 Babcock, supra note 62, at 377.
273 Id.
274 Id. at 375. See, e.g., Editorial, Gallows Watch: Canadian'sDeath Sentence Should Be
Commuted to Life, DALLAS MORNING NEws, June 15, 1999, at 12A; Editorial, Stan
Faulder'sExecution, TORONTO STAR, June 18, 1999, at ed. 1; Paul Stanway, FaulderExecution Doesn't Make Case, CALGARY SuN, June 20, 1999, at C6; Editorial, Texas and International Law, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 9, 1998, at A28 (arguing that the Texas Pardons Board
should commute Faulder's death sentence to life in prison).
275 Babcock, supra note 62, at 375.
276 Id. at 377.
277 Id. (citing Janice Tobbetts, Supportfor Death Penalty Falls, MoTrEAL GAZETTE,
Dec. 31, 1998, at A3).
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Also significant in this narrative of norm transfer is that, in the
1996 case, the Fifth Circuit adopted Babcock's framing of the VCCR
notification provision as a right belonging to the criminal defendant
thus providing a basis for challenge to all criminal convictions in
which the right was denied.2 78 The challenge for criminal defendants
was coming up with ways in which denial of the right would rise to the
level of a violation of well-settled criminal due process, such as voluntariness of confessions and the right to effective assistance of counsel
that could be raised in direct appeals or collateral challenges. These
avenues of argument remain open post-Sanchez-Llamas.
What is unusual in this case is that the spark igniting the "discovery" of the VCCR came from a traditional state actor, the government
of Canada, interacting with a domestic criminal defense attorney.2 79
In some ways, the story of the VCCR and the death penalty follows the
traditional narrative of the consular function for expatriates in foreign
lands. The consular function serves to mediate between the domestic
legal system (here, a Canadian system in which the death penalty was
illegal and no executions had been carried out since 1962280), and the
foreign system (the criminal justice system of the State of Texas which
executed thirty-seven prisoners in 1997281) which the national government does not fully control. But it does so in a nontraditional way.
The groups that are traditionally considered "norm entrepreneurs" in international human rights-the well-established transnational NGOs and high-profile legal academics-became involved after
the spark from the government of Canada and their work, in turn,
further energized the official position of Canada. Amnesty International was actively involved in Faulder's case starting in spring 1992,
supporting Babcock with governmental lobbying, publicity and research. 282 The Canadian government was actively engaged in traditional diplomatic appeals to the U.S. government and explicitly
sought clemency. 28 3 Only after concerted lobbying by NGOs and aca278

Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 520 (5th Cir. 1996).

279

Sims & Carter, supra note 233, at 28.

280 Amnesty Int'l, The Death Penalty in Canada: Twenty Years of Abolition (Apr.
2000), http://www.amnesty.ca/deathpenalty/canada.php. The death penalty was
abolished in Canada by an Act of Parliament in 1976. It was retained for only extreme
military crimes until 1998 when it was removed from the National Defense Act. No
military execution had taken place since the late 1940s. The last civilian execution
took place in Canada in 1962. Id.
281 Tex. Dep't of Justice, Texas State Executions by Year (Sept. 13, 2006), http://
www.tdcj.state.tx.us/stat/annual.htm.

282

Babcock, supra note 62, at 375-76.

283

Id.
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demics did the government of Canada agree to engage in legal ac2 4
tions, such as filing amicus briefs.
The consular function was not the only way in which a formal
procedural mechanism had served to mediate between U.S. and Canadian law on the death penalty. The Supreme Court of Canada in 2001
cited what it perceived to be the arbitrary application of the death
penalty in the United States in an opinion refusing extradition of persons sought in the United States on capital charges. 28 5 Up to that
point, Canada had been willing to extradite individuals found in Canadian territory who were wanted on capital charges in the United
States, 286 even though the terms of the U.S.-Canada extradition treaty
would have permitted it to refuse if the United States failed to provide
on request "such assurances as the requested State considers sufficient
that the death penalty shall not be imposed, or, if imposed, shall not
be executed." 28 7 The Canadian government had not uniformly requested such assurances.
The Canadian courts had been generally deferential to the discretionary decision of the government to extradite. 2 8

In the Burns

case, however, the Canadian government had chosen to extradite two
men wanted for capital murder charges in the state of Washington. 28 9
In deciding the appeal of the extradition, the Canadian Court specifically held the U.S. capital punishment practices to be arbitrary, in that
innocent persons had a substantial chance of being executed. 290 The
Canadian Court cited a Chicago Tribune study concluding that a number of persons on Illinois death row were, in fact, innocent,29 1 a U.S.
Department of Justice study demonstrating a racial disparity in the
application of the death penalty, 292 and the American Bar Association's call for a moratorium on the death penalty on the grounds of
inadequate capital representation and racial and socio-economic bias
2 93
in sentencing patterns.
284 E-mail from Mark Warren, Dir. of Human Rights Research, Amnesty Int'l, to
Margaret E. McGuinness, Assoc. Professor of Law, Univ. of Missouri-Columbia (July
20, 2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter Warren e-mail].
285 United States v. Burns, [2001] S.C.R. 283, 287-88.
286 See Kindler v. Can. (Minister of J.), [1991] S.C.R. 779, 780-84; Reference Re
Ng Extradition (Can.), [19911 S.C.R. 858, 859-60.
287 Treaty on Extradition, U.S.-Can., art. 5, Dec. 3, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 983.
288 Quigley, supra note 149, at 184-85.
289 Bums, [2001] S.C.R. at 284-85.
290 Id. at 287-88.
291 Id. at 343-44.
292 Id. at 344-45.
293 Id. at 342. The Court did not go so far as to conclude that there was "an
international law norm against the death penalty, or against extradition to face the
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practiced in the United
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ous decision
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ital defendants to the United valves,
allowing the import or export
"norm portals" serve as two-way
and preventing the import
of norms that are seen as rights-expanding,
as rights-restricting.
or export of norms that are seen
defense attorney,
The discussion between Babcock, a criminal set off a chain of
government
and a consular officer of the Canadian at the IACtHR, 29 9 the ICJ3 00
adjudication
to
events that led, ultimately,
0 1 and to diplomatic tensions between
and the U.S. Supreme Court
important economic partnersthe United States and its two most
Mexico and Canada.

The TransnationalAdvocacy Support Network
for legal mobilization" are
As noted earlier, "support structures
30 2 The Medellfn
in norm cascades.
often the key independent variable
B.

movement towards acceptance internadeath penalty" but instead found "significant that Canada has already adopted interjustice
tionally of a principle of fundamental
Id. at 287.
punishment."
capital
of
nally, namely the abolition
Freedoms, art. 7).
and
of Rights
294 Id. at (quoting Canadian Charter
295 Id. at 360.
296 Quigley, supra note 149, at 185.
[1991] S.C.R. 779, 782.
297 Kindler v. Can. (Minister of J.),
298 Warren e-mail, supra note 284.
Assistance in the Framework of the
299 The Right to Information on Consular Opinion OC-16/99, 1999 Inter-Am.
Advisory
Guarantees of the Due Process of Law,
1999).
1,
(Oct.
Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 16
1 (Mar. 31),
300

(Mex. V. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J.
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals

available at http://www.icj-cij'°rg/icjwww/idocket/imus/imusjudgment/imus-imus
3 3 1 .pdf.
judgment20040
301
302

(2005).
Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660
text.
accompanying
and
55
note
See supra
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transnational network of human
line of cases was no exception. A
and, most notably, foreign govrights activists, NGOs, defense lawyers,
and coordinated effort to bring the
ernments, carried out a concerted
of
conformance with the abolition
U.S. criminal justice system into
tactically adopted the
the death penalty. These "norm entrepreneurs"abolition. To be sure,
strategy of
VCCR as part of a broader global
were at different times motisome of the members of this network
holding the United States to
vated by additional concerns, including
at a time when the unipolarity
account for its international obligations
Nonetheless, the netof U.S. power was difficult to counterbalance.capital convictions and
overturning
work worked centrally toward
30 3
preventing future death sentences.
1. The Capital Defense Bar
line in the norm integration.
The capital defense bar was the first
and access to the broad transnaIn addition to the connection with
represented the advocacy support
tional abolitionist movement that
are amenable to novel argunetwork in these cases, capital defenders
strate3 0 4 Their clients have nothing left to lose by such
ments of law.
the
earnest
bar that began in
gies. Thus, it was the capital defense
foreign and international practices
efforts to have U.S. courts consider
0 5 and execution of
death penalty
juvenile
the
challenging
cases
in
3 0 6 Looking for any tool to prevent or overturn
the mentally retarded.
on the VCCR, which at least
a death conviction, the bar stumbled
in cases of foreign nationals.
would provide additional leverage
as one commentator has
Whatever the real or perceived value,
0
defense attorneys discovered
observed, "[iln the mid-199 s, criminal
noncapital cases
of Medellfn cases did advocates seek
303 Only after the initial wave
opinion. See
ICJ
of the enforceability of an
to test the more doctrinal question
that ICJ
argument
Ct. 2669, 2684 (2006) (rejecting
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S.
murder
attempted
for
conviction of defendant
decisions are binding and affirming
and other felony offenses).
OF FORTHE GAP: ErFErriVE REPRESENTATION
ANNE JAMES ET AL., BRIDGING
http://internationaljusCASES (2005), available at
EIGN NATIONALS IN U.S. CRIMINAL
of how attorneys were

304

See

(giving examples
ticeproject.org/pdfs/BridgingtheGap2nd'pdf
and are instructed in these claims).
overU.S. 551, 575-79 (2005) (acknowledging
305 Cf Roper v. Simmons, 543
juveniles).
the death penalty against
whelming global opposition to imposing
imposing the
304, 316 n.20 (2002) (noting that
306 Cf Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
disapproved"
retarded is "overwhelmingly
death penalty on the mentally
internationally).
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' 30 7 Indeed, an article
Relations.
the Vienna Convention on Consular
essential to providing adequate
from 1995 arguing that the VCCR was
noted the value of this "discovcriminal defense for foreign nationals
ery" for criminal defense lawyers:
attention to protecting the
Thus far, courts have given little
of attention stems in part from
right of consular access. The lack
of this right and. . . fail to
the fact that attorneys are often unaware
as error in
assign the denial of consular access
raise it at trial or 3to
08
the initial appeal.
viewed as "a linchpin for the effectuaThe right of consular access was
the criminal process."309
tion of other rights in
was to develop strategies
The explicit advice to capital defenders
nationals that would "show
in criminal cases against foreign
prejudice" from the failure to notify:
from Breard, Rangel-Gonzales
Drawing on the lessons we can distill
develop a record that specifiand Faulder,defense counsel should
consul would do that a defense
cally demonstrates what the foreign
to accomplish. The court deciattorney would not have been able
assistance for actions that the
sions... reflect the view that consular
is insufficient for prejudice.
defense attorney could have taken
the resources and special experThus, it is important to emphasize
consul would have helped with
tise of the consulate. If the foreign
for example, the record could
financial resources for investigation,
would have been interviewed, the
reflect the additional people who
country that defense counadditional trips to the defendant's home
defense, or the additional exsel would have used to assist in the 310
retained.
perts who would have been
ways in which the role of the
This advice included, significantly,
from the role of defense counconsular officer could be distinguished
importance of the right to remain
sel, for example, in explaining the
to
or the risks inherent in going
silent within the American system
31 1 Advocates argued that
trial versus accepting a plea arrangement.
to help overcome discriminathe notification provision was important
in capital cases where the prosecution based on alienage, particularly

of ReICJProvisionalMeasures and the Meaning
307 Linda E. Carter, Compliance with
and
Avena
Relations:
Consular
on
Convention
view and Reconsideration under the Vienna
(2003).
119
25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 117,
Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.),
727.
at
175,
308 Shank & Quigley, supra note
309 Id. at 752.
at 58.
310 Sims & Carter, supra note 233,
311 Id.
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tion, judge and jury enjoy considerable discretion. 12 The criminal
defense bar began to frame the consular notification provision as designed "[t]o compensate for the disadvantages experienced by accused foreign nationals,"3' t 3 which would appeal to basic judicial
notions of fairness and fair play. An advocacy discussion from 1995
shows how this was accomplished:
Foreign nationals arrested in the United States confront this
disadvantage [of alienage] in several ways. In most cases, they are
unfamiliar with U.S. customs, police policies, and criminal proceedings, For instance, an accused from Latin America would be familiar with the Napoleonic-style legal system, which differs significantly
from practices in the United States. A foreigner may also be particularly vulnerable to deception used by police detectives as a standard interrogation technique. Moreover, an accused from a
country with an authoritarian government may anticipate torture or
retaliation against family members; thus, even cajoling statements
31 4
by police interrogators may evoke fear.
In death penalty cases, this perceived marginal advantage of consular
notification became important.
As a result of this discovery of the VCCR taking place within criminal defense circles, early writing in the United States about the VCCR
originated not with the kinds of public international law scholars who
filed amicus briefs in Medellin debating whether Article III courts
should have a role in giving effect to an international courtjudgment,
but with practicing local criminal defense lawyers who joined up with
foreign governments and international human rights advocates.A15 International human rights professors were eventually recruited to join
that network, to identify ways to increase VCCR compliance and ways
to develop arguments about noncompliance that could be used in
3 16
death penalty cases.
312 Shank & Quigley, supra note 175, at 739-40; see also supra notes 292-93 and
accompanying text (discussing racial disparities in capital sentencing).
313 See Logene L. Foster & Steven Doggett, Vienna Convention: New Toolfor Representing Foreign Nationals in the CriminalJusticeSystem, CHAMPION, Mar. 1997, at 16, 16.
314 Shank & Quigley, supra note 175, at 720.
315 See Robert F. Brooks & William H. Wright, Jr., States Deny Treaty Rights to Foreign
Defendants, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 4, 1996, at B8 (Brooks and Wright are practicing attorneys
who represented Mario Murphy and were very active in mobilizing and informing the
legal community); Foster & Dogget, supra note 313, at 18 (noting that Foster and
Doggett practice criminal defense law); Warren e-mail, supra note 284. Shank and
Quigley are law professors, as are Sims and Carter. Sims and Carter's article in CRAMPION, supra note 233, was addressed to the defense bar.
316 E-mail from William Aceves, Professor of Law and Dir. of the Int'l Legal Studies Program, Cal. W. Sch. of Law to Margaret E. McGuinness, Assoc. Professor of Law,
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Foreign States as Agents: Litigation and Advocacy

The Medellfn line of cases points out the important role abolitionist foreign states have played in chipping away at the death penalty in
the United States. 3 1 7 States acted in a variety of roles: as traditional
unitary instrumental actors, promoting their interest in political, diplomatic and public arenas; as state agents of their citizens, representing claims before international tribunals; and as norm entrepreneurs,
directly advocating on behalf of their nationals or the nationals of
other abolitionist states.
i.

Mexico

Mexico has a unique interest in looking out for the welfare of its
nationals in the United States, the country with the largest number of
expatriate Mexicans. During the 1980s, the number of legal immigrants from Mexico in the United States reached three million; an
estimated 800,000 were in the country without documentation. 31 8 By
the end of that decade, Mexican nationals represented the single largest group of noncitizens in the United States, many of whom were
present unlawfully, occupied the lowest rung in the socio-economic
ladder, and were victims of widespread discrimination. 319 Despite
well-known problems with the administration of criminal justice at
home (including endemic corruption and lack of adequate procedural safeguards),320 Mexico initiated in 1986 the program of Legal ConUniv. of Missouri-Columbia (July 31, 2006) (on file with author) [hereinafter Aceves
e-mail].
317 See Babcock, supra note 62, at 377 ("Undoubtedly, foreign governments have
been the most influential agents in transnational capital litigation.").
318 Jorge Durand et al., Mexican Immigration to the United States: Continuities and
Changes, 36 LATIN Am. R s. REv. 107, 107-08 (2001).
319 Approximately one million Mexicans remained undocumented in 1992, which
represented thirty-one percent of the total unauthorized population in the United
States. Id. at 107-08. Precise numbers of foreign nationals are hard to come by. The
Census Bureau estimates that twelve million residents in the United States are noncitizens and that more than twenty million foreigners visit the United States each year.
SeeJumES ET AL., supranote 304, at 5 (citing CampbellJ. Gibson & Emily Lennon, U.S.
Bureau of the Census, Historical Census Statistics on the Foreign-Born Population of the
United States: 1850-1990 (Population Division Working Paper No. 29), available at
http://www.census.gov/population/www/documentation/twpsOO29/twpsO029.
html).
320 The Mexican criminal justice system continues to be plagued by poor, overcrowded prison systems, arbitrary arrests and detentions, corruption, and a lack of
transparency. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2005 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HutmAN RIGHTS
PRAcTicEs: MExico (2006), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/ris/hrrpt/2005/
62736.htm.
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sultation and Defense for Mexicans Abroad as a means of supporting
consular officers in their representation of Mexicans facing criminal
32
legal proceedings outside Mexico. '
Mexico has a long history of leveraging consular protection on
behalf of nationals on death row in the United States.3 2 2 Mexico's
awareness of the problem of non-notification was heightened by the
Faulder case, and Mexico subsequently played a direct advocacy role
in Fierro v. State.3 23 Fierro was a Mexican national convicted and sentenced to death for murder of a taxicab driver. Fierro confessed to
the El Paso police five months after the murder. 324 The police did not
inform him of his right to notify the Mexican consulate, despite the
fact that Mexico operated a consulate in El Paso. 32 5 The circum321 In effect, "Mexicans Abroad" meant Mexican nationals in the United States.
Application of Mexico in the Avena Case, supra note 96, paras. 19, 22. This program
was put in place five years after the Mexican Foreign Ministry created a special category of consular officer devoted to protecting the interests of Mexican nationals
abroad. Id. This category is roughly equivalent to the American Citizen Services office within the Consular Affairs Bureau of the U.S. State Department. Thus, more
than forty years lapsed between the time of the 1942 Consular Convention between
the United States and Mexico and the Mexican foreign ministry elevating the protective consular function to a level of significance.
322 See Meade Affidavit, supra note 105 (describing the measurable impact consular intervention during the 1920s, '30s and '40s had in helping Mexican nationals
avoid death sentences in the United States).
323 706 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Mexico was aware of the importance
of the consular notification provisions under the 1923 Claims Convention with the
United States, under which the United States had filed several claims of "denial of
justice." Several of the cases addressed by the Commissioners made reference to the
efforts of United States consular officers to protect the rights of their detained nationals. See, e.g., Harry Roberts (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 77 (1926); B.E.
Chattin (U.S. v. Mex.), 4 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 282 (1927). Among the claims adjudicated by the Commission was that of Walter H. Faulkner, who claimed that Mexican
authorities had prevented him from communicating with the United States consul for
a period of several days. Although the Commission ultimately concluded that claimant failed to prove he was deprived of consular access, it held that "a foreigner, not
familiar with the laws of the country where he temporarily resides, should be given
this opportunity." Walter H. Faulkner (U.S. v. Mex.), Opinions of the Commissioners
Under the Convention Concluded September 8, 1923, at 86, 90 (1926). Brief Amicus
Curiae of the Government of the United Mexican States in Support of Petitioner Jose
Ernesto Medellin at 18, Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-5928), 2005
WL 152925.
324 Fierro had been arrested on the tip of a sixteen-year-old with a history of
mental problems, who had claimed to be in the cab with Fierro and witnessed the
murder. Shank & Quigley, supra note 175, at 725. There was no physical evidence to
connect Fierro to the crime. Id.
325

Id. at 726.
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stances of the confession were questionable.3 2 6 The confession was
32 7
presented at trial and Fierro was convicted and sentenced to death.

On the basis of a new petition in 1994, a district court threw out the
confession on the ground that there was "a strong likelihood that the
Defendant's confession was coerced by the actions of the Judrez police" with the acquiescence of the El Paso police.3 28 On appeal, the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed with the setting aside of
the conviction, finding that the introduction of the confession was
harmless error. 3 29 On a 5-4 vote, the Court of Criminal Appeals found
33 0
the additional evidence sufficient to sustain the guilty verdict.

ii.

The IACtHR case

In December 1997, just a few months following the executions of
two Mexican citizens-Irineo Tristan Montoya in Texas 33 1 and Mario
Benjamin Murphy in Virginia 3 .92-Mexico brought a case against the
United States before the LACtHR seeking an advisory opinion as to the
legal obligation of the United States to enforce the Article 36 notification requirement and clarification of the minimal judicial remedy for
326 The El Paso police cooperated with the Ciudad Judrez, Mexico police department in the investigation, and the CiudadJu~rez police arrested Fierro's mother and
stepfather to question them regarding Fierro. Id. at 725-26. During his questioning
at the El Paso police station, the detective offered to allow Fierro to speak with the
Ciudad Judrez police, who apparently convinced him that his parents would not be
released until he confessed. Id. at 726. The stepfather later testified that as he was
being released in Ciudad Jud1rez, an officer told him that it was because Fierro had
confessed in El Paso. Id.
327 Ex parte Fierro, 934 S.W.2d 370, 371-72 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
328 Quigley, supra note 149, at 183 (citing Fierro, 934 S.W.2d at 371).
329 Fierro, 934 S.W.2d at 371-72.
330 Quigley, supra note 149, at 183 (citing Fierro, 934 S.W.2d at 377). The prosecuting attorney at the trial had filed an affidavit to the appeals court indicating that,
had he known of the circumstances of the confession, he would have joined a motion
to suppress the confession. Id.
331 In re Irineo Tristan Montoya, 520 U.S. 1284 (1997) (denying habeas petition
requesting stay of execution). The fact that Montoya was the first Mexican executed
in the United States in over fifty years galvanized Mexican public opinion. In addition, Mexico had filed four diplomatic protests with the State Department, filed a
formal request for commutation with the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles, and
requested a reprieve from the Governor of Texas. See Application of Mexico in the
Avena Case, supra note 96, para. 49, at 22. The April 1997 exoneration and release of
Ricardo Aldape Guerra from Texas death row after serving fifteen years in prison
further focused attention on other Mexicans facing the death penalty in the United
States. See Mexican Long Held in Texas Murder Wins His Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,
1997, at A16. For more discussion of the Adalpe Guerra case see infra note 356.
332 Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 98 (4th Cir. 1997).
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failure to notify detainees who are subsequently sentenced to
death. 333 The application was thus explicitly limited to capital cases.
The first interpretation of the United States' legal obligations in terms
of a remedy was issued on April 30, 1998, when the Inter-American
Commission made a requested written submission to the IACtHR in
which it concluded that, in death penalty cases, the due process rights
established under the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties
of Man require a judicial remedy for a violation of the VCCR notification provisions. 33 4 Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the
International Human Rights Law Institute, and the Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights also made submissions to the IACtHR in support of a finding of an individual right to a remedy for violations of
Article 36.' 35
The issue for human rights activists was not so much the immediate fate of the tens of thousands of foreign nationals arrested in the
United States each year, 33 6 but rather the persistence of the death
penalty in the United States. The positions taken by (nearly all) the
other OAS states that submitted briefs, along with the NGO amici, was
similarly rooted in the abolitionist position.3 37
This was the first opportunity for the United States to take a formal position on the question of remedies for non-notification in an
international forum. In addition to submitting several procedural
challenges to the request for advisory opinion, 33 8 the United States
argued that the VCCR did not create an individual right to consular
333 Advisory Opinion, supra note 299, para. 1. For a summary of the procedural
basis of the advisory opinion, see William J. Aceves, The Right to Information on Consular
Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantee of Due Process of Law, Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 555, 555-56 (2000).

334 Aceves, supra note 333, at 556 & n.7. Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Paraguay also made submissions to the
Court. Id. at 556.
335 Id. at 556.
336 There are no comprehensive statistics available on the total number of foreign
citizens arrested each year in the United States, but the Bureau of Justice Statistics
estimated at year end 2001 that approximately four percent of the inmate population
in state institutions are noncitizens. SeeJAMEs ET AL., supra note 304, at 5 (citing U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL OFFENDERS STATISTICS, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/bjs/crimoff.htm). Applying the same ratio in the federal prison system, some
52,000 foreign nationals are imprisoned in the United States. Id.
337 The OAS states that retain the death penalty are Guatemala, Guyana, Belize,
Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, St. Kitts and
Nevis, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, Grenada (abolitionist in practice), and Bolivia (military
law only). See Amnesty Int'l, Abolitionist and Retentionist Countries, Sept. 5, 2006,
http://web.amnesty.org/pages/deathpenalty-countries-eng.
338 See Aceves, supra note 333, at 556.
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assistance but rather "provides that a receiving State must inform a
detainee that, if he requests, sending State consular officers may be
notified of his detention (hence, the term "consular notification")." 339
Further, the United States argued that compliance with the VCCR was
not a prerequisite for observance of human rights in criminal cases.
The international human rights instruments invoked by Mexico in its
petition were applicable to all foreign nationals-regardless of the sta34 0
tus of consular relations between the two states.
In its published opinion of October 1999, the IACtHR addressed
eight issues on the merits of the case:3 41 (1) Based on the text and its
travaux preparatoires,Article 36 "endows a detained foreign national
with individual rights that are the counterpart to the host State's correlative duties;" 342 (2) the right to seek consular assistance under Article 36 concerns the protection of human rights and is thus part of the
body of international human rights law;3 43 (3) the phrase "without

delay" included in Article 36(1) (b) requires that foreign nationals be
informed of their right to consular assistance at the time they are detained (time of deprivation of liberty) and in any event before they
are required to make statements to law enforcement officials;3 44 (4)
the sending state need not issue a protest in order to trigger the rights
belonging to the individual foreign national;3 45 (5) Articles 2 (no discrimination on the basis of national origin), 6 (right to life), 14
(equality before the law and fair judicial proceedings), and 50 (application to federal states) of the ICCPR concern the protection of
human rights in the American states;3 4 6 (6) the dynamic evolution of
international human rights law renders enforcement of Article
36(1) (b) of the VCCR essential to the implementation of due process
of law for all individuals as set out in Article 14 of the ICCPR;3 4 7 (7)
failure to notify in cases in which the death sentence is imposed is also
an arbitrary deprivation of life that gives rise to state responsibility and
339 Id. at 557 (citing Written Observations of the United States of America 5 (June
10, 1998) (on file with author)).
340 Id.
341 The LACtHR rejected the procedural objections made by the United States and
affirmed its authority to issue advisory opinions. Advisory Opinion, supra note 299,
para. 65.
342 Id. para. 84.
343 Id. para. 141, at 64.
344 Id.
345 Id. para. 141, at 65.
346 Id. Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Lucia
were the only OAS member states not parties to the ICCPR at the time of the opinion.
Id. para. 109.
347 Id. para. 141, at 65.
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an obligation to make reparations;3 48 and (8) the obligations under
Article 36 must be observed regardless of the federal structure of the
United States. - 49
Because it swept so broadly to include arguments based on the
traditional diplomatic remedies of consular violations, the nonapplication of ICCPR to the United States in light of its reservations, and
the limitations on the national government's ability to fashion relief
where the criminal justice system operates largely through federal
states, this opinion provided the basis for subsequent legal arguments
before the ICJ and those in the U.S. courts seeking to give the ICJ
3 50
opinions effect.

Abolitionist academic observers at the time of the opinion were
untroubled by this apparent overreaching because it operated to expand human rights and limit the application of the death penalty.
William Aceves noted the IACtHR "employ[ed] a teleological method
of interpretation that is reminiscent of the early case law of the European Court of Justice ....

[B]as[ing] its analysis on the notion that

3'
due process is not a static concept; it is dynamic and evolutionary.

3.

55

Foreign Governments and NGOs: Role Reversals

Following the IACtHR advisory opinion, Mexico established in
September 2000 the Mexican Capital Legal Assistance Program
(MCLAP) in the United States, whose mission would be to provide
advisory and financial support to Mexican nationals charged with capital crimes in the United States. 352 At the time, it was the only such
348 Id. para. 137. In so holding, the Court noted its earlier advisory opinion that
limited capital punishment by the principle of no arbitrary deprivation of life. Id.
para. 134; see also Restrictions to the Death Penalty (Arts. 4(2) and 4(4) American
Convention on Human Rights) Advisory Opinion OC-3/83, 1983 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. A) No. 3 paras. 52, 55 (Sept. 8, 1983).
349 Advisory Opinion, supra note 299, para. 141 at 65. This conclusion was in line
with an earlier case in which the IACtHR had held that a state may not base its noncompliance with international obligations on its federal structure. See Garrido and
Baigorria Case, 1998 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 39, para. 46 (Feb. 6, 1996).
350 Paraguay had filed its complaint in the Breard case in 1998, a year before the
Advisory Opinion was issued; the arguments were nonetheless available-and were
used-in the subsequent IC] cases. See infra Part IV.B.4.
351 Aceves, supra note 333, at 561.
352 Application of Mexico in the Avena Case, supra note 96, para. 25. Mexico had
created the Program of Legal Consultation and Defense for Mexicans Abroad which
trained "a select cadre of consular officers in American law for the express purpose of
assisting attorneys representing Mexican nationals in United States legal proceedings." Id. para. 22.
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in the
assistance program of a foreign government
capital legal 35
3

United States.
the quality of
The stated purpose of the program was to "enhance
defendants, to im-

capital
legal representation available to Mexican
officers to assist them, and to
prove the ability of Mexican consular
Article 36 of the Vienna

with
increase awareness of and compliance
address35 4 The effect of the program was remarkable in
Convention."
and bias in sentencing
ing the very inadequacies in representation
unsuccessful challenges based on
that had been raised in the earlier,
in its Avena application to the ICJ:
non-notification. As Mexico noted
with

attorneys have assisted
Since its inception, the Program's
have played a decisive role in
approximately 110 cases. They
death penalty in 27 cases; 80
preventing the imposition of the
the program, Mexico has filed
others remain pending. Through
and offered important legal assisamicus curiae briefs in 13 cases
other cases. Often, Program attortance to defence counsel in 49
issues of international law
neys have raised claims and emphasized
defence counsel inoverlooked by 355
that would otherwise have been
nationals.
foreign
experienced in representing
to
role of the foreign government
This statement shows how the
the
against
necessary, lodge protests
communicate with and, where
by a strategy in which the fornational government was supplemented
nationals.
active advocate on behalf of its
eign government became an
by the
out
carried
consular function
In capital cases, the traditional
which
by this super public defender,
government of Mexico was aided
to
at home that could be leveraged
possessed full governmental power
loof criminal defense: investigating,
assist in the essential functions
novel
legal defenses-some of them
cating witnesses, and formulating
human rights law.
claims based on international
at the defense counsel level, the
In addition to providing services
directly as a party in several cases
government of Mexico intervened
the govPrior to the IACtHR opinion,
following the IACtHR opinion.
a party
as
directly in three VCCR cases
ernment of Mexico intervened
opin3 56 In the three years following the IACtHR
or as amicus curiae.
353 Id. para. 25.
attorney to raise
MCLAP was Sandra Babcock, the
354 Id. The first director of the
233-35. El
notes
See supra text accompanying
the VCCR claim in the Faulder case.
284.
note
supra
e-mail,
in 2003. Warren
Salvador established a similar program
26.
para.
96,
note
the Avena Case, supra
355 Application of Mexico in
Mexico as ami116 F.3d 97 (4th. Cir. 1997) (listing
Netherland,
v.
17
356 See Murphy
Consulate Gen. of Mex. v. Phillips,
cus curiae assisting the defendant-appellant);
97-01075CV
No.
United Mexican States v. Woods,
of MexiF. Supp. 2d 1318 (S.D. Fla. 1998);
suit for injunction to prevent execution
(filing
19)
PHX SMM (D. Ariz. May
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ion and through the MCLAP, Mexico intervened as amicus curiae in
sixteen cases and funded or assisted an additional ninety-nine cases. 357
While the IACtHR opinion did not appear to shift the receptiveness of
the U.S. government or state or federal courts on the question of remedies for convictions that pre-dated the IACtHR opinion, it laid a significant jurisprudential foundation for other challenges in traditional
"vertical" fora such as the ICJ.
4. The Persistence of Traditional Statehood
Mexico did not abandon diplomatic channels after the IACtHR
opinion was issued. It continued to submit diplomatic protests or requests for clemency to state and federal officials. 35 8 In the two preIACtHR executions-Irineo Tristan Montoya in Texas3 5 9 and Mario
Benjamin Murphy in Virginia 360-Mexico requested commutation
and federal government intervention with state authorities. In both
cases, the federal government remained silent. 61 After the executions were carried out, the State Department issued a formal apology
36 2
to the government of Mexico for the violations of the VCCR.

can national who had not received consular notification at time of arrest), affd 126
F.3d 1220 (9th Cir. 1997). Mexico also filed an amicus brief in Guerra v. Johnson, 90
F.3d 1075 (5th Cir. 1996); Brief Amicus Curiae of United Mexican States, Guerra, 90
F.3d 1075 (No. 95-20443), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diana/
guerra/20443ac.html. That case did not involve a VCCR challenge, but instead the
applicability of international norms banning racially discriminatory treatment.
357 Mexico stated in its pleadings in Avena:
Through the combined efforts of consular officers and the Program lawyers,
Mexico has played a decisive role in preventing the imposition of the death
penalty in at least forty-five cases in less than three years. In that same time,
Mexico has filed sixteen amicus curiae briefs in U.S. courts, has provided
funds for investigators and experts in at least twenty-two cases, and has offered important legal assistance to defense counsel in sixty-seven other cases.
Memorial of Mex., Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) para. 38 (June
20, 2003) (citations omitteii), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/
imus/imuspleadings/imus ipleadings-toc.htm.
358 See Application of Mexico in the Avena Case, supra note 96, para. 49 (noting
that Mexico had filed diplomatic notes expressing the "vital nature of the rights to
consular notification" in at least twenty capital cases involving Mexican nationals between 1997 and 2003).
359 In re Irineo Tristan Montoya, 520 U.S. 1284 (1997).
360 Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97 (4th Cir. 1997).
361 Application of Mexico in the Avena Case, supra note 96, paras. 50-59.
362 See id. para. 53. Mexico accepted the July 1997 apology over the execution of
Montoya, but maintained its view that the United States had to do more than apologize-particularly in capital cases-and provide some sort of judicial relief in failure
to notify cases. Id. Mexico also noted that, at that time, thirty-six Mexican nationals
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In 2000, Texas executed Miguel Angel Flores and again the State
Department issued Mexico a diplomatic note apologizing for the failure of Texas authorities to comply with Article 36.363 In 2002, Texas
executed Javier Suarez Medina.36 4 In that case, the Mexican government made direct protests through its foreign minister to the U.S.
Secretary of State and President of Mexico directly requested a reprieve from the Governor of Texas. 3 65 Mexico supported Medina's
individual petition to the IACtHR.3 66 In Medina, Mexico also requested the support of other governments and international organizations, which submitted their views to courts and the state and federal
officials involved in the case. 367 In the Flores case, Mexico protested
3
formally to the State Department and to the Texas authorities.

68

It

also supported Flores' petition to the IACtHR, which resulted in an
issuance by the IACtHR of precautionary measures.
i.

Paraguay

Paraguay intervened in the non-notification case of Angel Breard
in 1996, well before the IACtHR advisory opinion. 369 Breard was a
Paraguayan national who was not notified of his right to contact his
consulate, was charged with murder and attempted rape, and subsequently tried, convicted and sentenced to death in Virginia state
court. 370 Breard raised the VCCR claim for the first time in his federal

habeas action. 371 The government of Paraguay filed suit against the
governor of Virginia in federal court, seeking an injunction of the exremained on death row in the United States; in none of the cases did the arresting
authorities comply with the Article 36 notification requirement. Id. Following the
State Department apology over the execution of Murphy, Mexico again filed a diplomatic note stating that apology was an inadequate remedy for violation of the VCCR.
Id. para. 56.
363 Id. paras. 57-58.
364 Id. para. 59.
365 Id.
366 This petition, like that of Flores, resulted in an order of precautionary measures by the IACtHR. Id.; Javier Suarez Medina, Case 12.421, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 91/05, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.124, doc. 5, para. 5 (2005), available at http://www.
cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2005eng/USA.12421 eng.htm.
367 Application of Mexico in the Avena Case, supra note 96, para. 59. Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala. Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, Poland, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, Uruguay, Venezuela, the Holy
See and the European Union all supported Mexico's efforts. Id.
368 Id. paras. 233-34.
369 Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 374 (1998) (per curiam) (denying certiorari).
370 Id. at 371.
371 Id. at 373.
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ecution and a declaration voiding the conviction as a remedy for the
VCCR violation. 372 This was the first such suit filed by a foreign government directly against a state official seeking to enjoin an execution
and commute a death sentence.3 7 3 On appeal to the Supreme Court,
Breard's habeas claim was consolidated with the Paraguay suit against
Virginia. Paraguay had filed a parallel case at the ICJ, in which it requested provisional measures to stay Breard's execution while the ICJ
considered Paraguay's application for state remedies against the
United States for the violation of the Convention. The ICJ issued provisional measures requesting that the United States take "all measures
at its disposal" to prevent the execution.37 4 Four other foreign governments filed amici briefs in support of Paraguay in its suit before
3 75
the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court refused to give effect to the ICJ provisional
measures order, deciding Breard's appeal on the basis of federal
habeas law, under which Bread's claim was deemed procedurally defaulted. 376 The Court found Paraguay's claim against Virginia was
barred under the Eleventh Amendment and failed to state a claim
under

ii.

§ 1983. 37 7

Germany

Germany also took on the role of advocate on its own behalf and
on behalf of two German nationals facing the death penalty in Arizona, Karl and Walter LaGrand. Germany started with traditional diplomatic interventions with the U.S. government and Arizona state
officials.378 When those efforts failed to stop the execution of one of
the brothers, Germany wasted no time and filed an application to the
372 Republic of Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1271 (E.D. Va. 1996), affd,
134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998).
373 Mexico became the second when it filed suit against Arizona on behalf of
death row inmate Ramon Martinez Villarreal on the basis of failure to notify. Babcock, supra note 62, at 378-79 & n.47 (citing Complaint, United Mexican States v.
Woods (D.C. Ariz. 1997) (No. CV 97-1075-PHX SMM)). The case was dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. United Mexican States v. Woods, 126 F.3d 1220,
1221 (9th Cir. 1997). The executions of Murphy and Montoya, see supra notes 331-32
and accompanying text, took place while the Villarreal case was pending.
374 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248, 258
(Apr. 9).
375 Babcock, supra note 62, at 378.
376 Breard, 523 U.S. at 375-77; see also Jonathon I. Charney & W. Michael
Reislman, Agora: Breard, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 666, 673 (1998) (providing a detailed
factual and procedural summary of the Breard case).
377 Breard, 523 U.S. at 377-78.
378 Babcock, supra note 62, at 381.
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ICJ on March 2, 1999, requesting provisional measures to stay the execution,3 79 which the ICJ issued the day after the application.""" Germany then filed suit under the original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, requesting it to comply with the ICJ order and stay the execution. 38 1 The Supreme Court denied the request for the stay as did the

38 3
Arizona governor.3 12 Walter LaGrand was executed.
Unlike Paraguay, Germany did not drop its case before the ICJ,
but pursued it to a final disposition, in which the ICJ held that the
United States had violated the VCCR, and that it had also violated the

prior provisional measure issued by the ICJ. -8

4

The ICJ further held

that, in the case of future non-notification for German nationals who
are subjected to "severe penalt(y]," the United States would be re38 5
quired to provide "review and reconsideration" of the convictions.
The ICJ opinion was aimed primarily at fashioning an appropriate
remedy for noncompliance in death penalty cases. 386 Most important,

the ICJ agreed with the JACtHR advisory opinion in holding that the
VCCR created an individual right to consular notification and access,
not just a right of the sending state.3 8

7

The ICJ left the U.S. govern-

ment with some leeway in interpretation of how to carry out the "review and reconsideration" requirement, leaving the "choice of means"
379 Application Instituting Proceedings, LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.) (Mar. 2,
1999), availableat http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusframe.htm (follow
"Application" hyperlink).
380 Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures Concerning the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (F.R.G. v. U.S.) (Order of Mar. 3, 1999), available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusorder/igus-iorder19990303.htm.
381 Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999).
382 Id.; LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.) 2001 I.CJ. Pleadings 466, paras. 23-28
(June 27, 2001), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusjudgment/igus_ ijudgment20010625.htm.
383 Babcock, supra note 62, at 381.
384 LaGrand, para. 128(5).
385 Id. para. 125.
386 See Babcock, supra note 62, at 382 ("Germany's persistence in obtaining the
Judgment, as well as the decision itself, have served to highlight the international
community's dissatisfaction with the United States' administration of the death penalty."). Interestingly, Germany had argued that had it been aware of the LaGrand
trial, consular officers would have provided mitigating evidence at the penalty phase
of the trial. The United States argued, effectively as it turns out, that Germany was
unable to demonstrate that it would have provided such assistance in 1984. LaGrand,
para. 72. The Court found it immaterial whether actual assistance would have affected the outcome, but rather held that establishing a violation of Article 36 was
enough to require a remedy; no prejudice need be shown by the defendant. Id. para.
73.
387 Id. para. 128(3).
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to the United States. 38 8 Up to the time of the Avena decision, this
permitted the United States to take the position that compliance with
a remedy could be brought about through state clemency proceedings; judicial action by U.S. courts would not be necessary to compliance with the ICJ order.3 8 9
Following the IACtHR advisory opinion in October 1999 and the
ICJ LaGrand final opinion in June 2001, full compliance with the requirement of consular notification at the time of arrest was still not
taking place for Mexicans or other foreign nationals, and Mexican
nationals were not successful in achieving reversals or obtaining collateral relief.390 That was in part due to the fact that the advisory opinion was not binding on the United States. Mexico thus pursued its
case before the ICJ to secure a binding decision that could halt the
executions of other Mexicans on death row. To do so, Mexico acceded to the dispute resolution provisions of the VCCR, which would
enable it to bring a challenge against the United States before the
icj.3 9 1
5.

The Collateral Role of International Organizations

The international and domestic governmental institutions that
liberal theory might predict would play a role in promoting norm shift
among persistent objectors have been marginal actors in this case.
With the exception of the IACtHR and its initial legal opinion, the
major human rights organs-the U.N. Human Rights Commission,
388 Id. para. 125.
389 Counter-Memorial of the United States, Avena and Other Mexican Nationals
(Mex. v. U.S.) paras. 6.53-6.78 (Nov. 3, 2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/
icjwww/idocket/imus/imuspleadings/imus-ipleadings.20031103_c-mem_06.pdf.
390 See Application of Mexico in the Avena Case, supra note 96, para. 27 ("[Mexico's] assistance often comes too late because local authorities of the constituent
states of the United States have neglected to inform Mexican nationals of their consular rights. If and when Mexican consulates heard of a detention and prosecution,
many forms of assistance that could have been rendered at an earlier stage have been
foreclosed by the operation of United States municipal law.").
391 William J. Aceves, Consular Notification and the Death Penalty: The ICJ's Judgment
in Avena, ASIL INSIG-Ts, n.7, Apr. 2004, http://www.asil.org/insights.insighl30.htm#.
edn7 (Mexico acceded to the Optional Protocol on March 5, 2002). In a press release, the Government of Mexico noted that "[t]he main goal of the lodging of this
complaint is for the ICJ to issue a ruling ...regarding the noncompliance by different U.S. state and municipal authorities of their international legal obligation covered
by the VCCR." Press Release, Govt of Mex., The Government of Mexico Submits to
the International Court of justice in the Hague the Cases of 54 Mexicans Sentenced
to Death in the U.S. 1 (Jan. 9, 2003), available at http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/pdfs/UnoffTransMexicolCJ.pdf.

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

(VOL.

82:2

the Human Rights Committee and the U.N. General Assemblyplayed almost no role. This is primarily because the United States was
not a party to Optional Protocol 2 of the ICCPR prohibiting the death
penalty and also has not acceded Optional Protocol 1 of that treaty,
through which states agree to be subject to the individual complaint
procedures at the Human Rights Committee.
The most valuable role international institutions played was as
supplemental information conduits. They transmitted public and private facts about the application of the death penalty in the United
States and served as a kind of bully pulpit from which abolitionist
states could raise their objections to U.S. practices.3 9 2 They also
played a role as a chip in the stakes for global human rights reputation. Following the LaGrand decision, the United States was kicked
off the U.N. Human Rights Commission for the first time in its history.
Notably, however, these institutions did not provide a significant forum for direct horizontal discussion between the national government
of the United States and the abolitionist states on the death penalty
question. Much of the diplomacy took place through bilateral, not
multilateral, channels.
C. Federal, State and Local Responses Post-IA CtHR
Between 1996 and 2003, the State Department took steps to bring
the United States in compliance with the notification provisions. Consistent with its view that the responsibility for enforcing the VCCR lay
with the executive, not the judiciary, it embarked on a broad educational program to inform local and state police, prosecutors, and
courts about the notification requirement. 393 The State Department
training materials for state and local law enforcement officials, prosecutors, and judges make clear that the importance of the notification
provision is "to help ensure that foreign governments can extend appropriate consular services to their nationals in the United States and
that the United States complies with its legal obligations to such governments. '3 9 4 In turn, states have published their own guidelines on
consular notification to local police. 39 5 These efforts have had an impact on law enforcement officials on the ground, and, importantly, on
state courts.
392
393
394
395

See Olson, supra note 151.
See Clark, supra note 219, at 22.
See STATE DEP'T INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 178, at i.
See, e.g., GEORGiA DzP'T OF CMw. AFFAIRS, A MODEL LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS MANUAL § 8-1, available at http://www.dca.state.ga.us/development/research/
programs/downloads/law/ChapS-l.html.
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Precise, measurable effects on state trial judges are difficult to
come by, in part because many judicial decisions in criminal trials are
unreported, and in part because judges do not always acknowledge
the rationales under which they reached decisions. Among the reported cases, state courts split on the question whether Article 36 creates an individual right that is judicially cognizable. Illinois state
courts held that the VCCR creates a judicially enforceable individual
right but that suppression of evidence was not available as a remedy.3 9 6 Other courts have held the opposite, finding no judicially enforceable right.3 97 Most courts to address the question have, like the
396 People v. Salgado, 854 N.E.2d 266, 277 (111. App. Ct. 2006) (finding that the
defendant "does have individual rights under the Vienna Convention, which were
violated," but the remedy for a violation is not suppression of evidence); People v.
Montano, 848 N.E.2d 616, 619 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (noting that although the VCCR
arguably conveys an individual right, Article 36 "does not create a fundamental," constitutional right); People v. Sanchez, 841 N.E.2d 478, 488 (I1. App. Ct. 2005) (finding
that "despite the recent cases establishing the fact the Vienna Convention is self-executing and that an individual right is created," suppression of evidence was not an
appropriate remedy).
397 Several post-Avena federal cases found no judicially enforceable individual
right. SeeMaharaj v. Sec'y for the Dept. of Corr., 432 F.3d 1292, 1307 (11th Cir. 2006)
(holding that "the Vienna Convention does not confer judicially enforceable individual rights" and that "a criminal defendant could not seek to have an indictment dismissed based on an alleged violation of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention"); Ortega
v. Dretke, No. 3-05-CV-0439-R, 2005 WL 1552802, at *2 (N.D. Tex. July 1, 2005) (following the decisions of the Fifth Circuit which held that Article 36 does not create a
judicially enforceable right); Dimas-Lopez v. United States, No. 01 Civ.7170, 2005 WL
1241890, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2005) (finding that the VCCR does not convey individual rights and therefore is not grounds for vacating a sentence); Moyhernandez v.
United States, No. 02 Civ.8062 MBM, 2004 WL 3035479, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 29,
2004) (finding that the Vienna Convention "was meant to protect the rights of states
to care for their nationals traveling abroad, not to protect the rights of individuals"
and as a result "If] ailure to notify the consul of a defendant's home country... is not
a basis for dismissing an indictment"). Several post-Avena state cases also found no
judicially enforceable individual right. See People v. Ontiveros, No. D044146, 2006
WL 1725906, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. June 23, 2006) (finding that even if VCCR creates
individual rights, suppression of evidence is not an appropriate remedy); Gomez v.
Commonwealth, 152 S.W.3d 238, 242 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004) (finding that the "Vienna
Convention does not confer standing on an individual foreign national to assert a
violation of the treaty in a domestic criminal case"); State v. King, 858 A.2d 4, 13 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (holding that no private enforceable right is created under
the VCCR and the exclusionary rule is not an appropriate remedy); State v.
Homdziuk, 848 A.2d 853, 859 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004) (holding that "the
exclusionary rule is inapplicable as a remedy for violation of Article 36 of the VCCR");
People v. Ortiz, 795 N.Y.S.2d 182, 182 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (finding that "[i]t is
questionable whether [the VCCR] confers judicially enforceable rights upon individuals, as opposed to foreign states" but in any event, "aviolation ...provides no basis for
suppression of a statement"); State v. Linnik, No. CA2004-06-015, 2006 WL 456792, at
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evidence under the exclusionary rule
vidual right, suppression of398
This suggests that the campaign to innot an appropriate remedy.
that "exclusion of incriminating statements
*6 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2006) (holding
violation of the consular notification
alleged
an
is not the appropriate remedy for
right").
an
in which courts found that, even assuming
398 There are several state cases
appropriate remedy. See People v. Valencia,
individual right, suppression was not an
that
(Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2004) (noting
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foreign
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notify
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crease compliance with the VCCR and thereby reduce capital
sentences or prevent executions has not been an unalloyed success.
However, the language in some of the reported opinions and the
existence of the training programs in the courts suggest that the notification requirement is being increasingly enforced and is having a
measurable effect in many places. In Alexander v. State,399 a Mexican
national unlawfully present in the United States was convicted of murder and sentenced to fifty-five years. 400 On a direct appeal, the Indi-

ana Court of Appeals upheld the conviction against challenges that
did not include a VCCR non-notification claim. 40 1 Nonetheless, in a
separate concurrence Judge Mathias noted that, while there was no
evidence whether Alexander had been notified of his right to notify
the consulate, the "right to contact a consular officer is an important
right that should not be ignored under any circumstance" and that
"failure to inform a defendant of his or her Vienna Convention right
is particularly egregious in cases .

.

. where risk of conviction of the

charged crimes carries such a high penalty." 402 He went further to
discuss the important reciprocity implications:
American citizens abroad would like to believe that they will be
treated fairly if they have a misfortune that subjects them to the
police, prosecutorial and penal authorities of a country they are visiting. But confidence in such fair treatment is unwarranted if we as
a nation do not set an example in our treatment of foreign nationals under similar circumstances in United States courts. I would
therefore urge law enforcement authorities to make such advice of
prejudice as a result of the delayed notification of the Canadian Consulate"); United
States v. Ruiz Gutierrez, No. CRIM.A. 04-470(ESH), 2005 WL 1115952, at *1 (D.D.C.
May 11, 2005) (finding that even if the VCCR does convey individual fights, a dismissal of an indictment would not be an appropriate remedy for an Article 36 violation);
Carbajal v. United States, No. 99 Civ.1916(MGC), 2004 WL 2283658, at *7 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 8, 2004) (finding that even if the plaintiff's VCCR rights have been violated,
plaintiff has failed to show how that violation prejudiced him); United States v. Brodie, 326 F. Supp. 2d 83, 90 (D.D.C. 2004) (finding that "a violation of the Vienna
Convention's requirement does not require suppression"); U.S. ex rel. Hurtado v. Briley, No. 03-G-7436 2004 WL 1462441, at *4 (ND. 111. June 28, 2004) (denying a claim
for habeas relief after Illinois Appellate Court determined that suppression was an
inappropriate remedy for a Article 36 violation); Jimenez v. Dretke, No. 3:02-CV-1716M, 2004 WL 789809, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 13, 2004) (finding that even if VCCR did
convey individual rights a petitioner "would not be entitled to habeas corpus relief").
399 837 N.E.2d 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
400 Id. at 554-55.
401 The defendant did, however, argue that admitting into evidence his status as
an illegal alien as an aggravating factor in his sentencing was improper. The court
rejected the contention. Id. at 556.
402 Id. at 557. (Mathias, J., concurring).
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a foreign national's right to consular contact standard operating

procedure in order to help establish an efficient and objectively fair
notice and contact process that compliments the Sixth Amendment
indigent right to counsel.

40 3

In other cases where convictions have been overturned on nonVCCR grounds, it seems clear that the failure to notify is viewed as a
basic violation of fairness by state judges.40 4 State judges have, for example, admonished local prosecutors for proceeding with cases in the
absence of consular notification. In two examples in Kansas from
2000, courts announced in dicta the importance they attached to the
notification provision, and urged state prosecutors to become familiar
4
with Article 36. 05

The Torres case in Oklahoma state court represents an important
40 6
example of the force this appeal to fairness has with state judges.
Osbaldo Torres was one of the fifty-four Mexicans included in the
Avena application. Two months after the Avena decision was issued,
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals voted 3-2 to stay the execution of Torres and remand the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine if denial of the notification right resulted in prejudice. 40 7 In
an unpublished concurring opinion,Judge Chapel "reasoned that the
United States freely and consensually signed and ratified the Vienna
Convention, including the Optional Protocol, creating binding, contract-like legal obligations between the United States and other State
Parties." 4 08 Judge Chapel held that the Oklahoma Court was bound
by the Supremacy Clause to give effect to both the VCCR and the
decision of the ICJ, not because the ICJ operated as superior authority
over U.S. courts, but because the President and Senate had committed the nation to be bound by the VCCR.40 9 The governor of
Oklahoma granted clemency and commuted Torres' sentence to life
without parole on the explicit grounds that the failure to notify violated the VCCR.

41 0

403 Id. at 557-58.
404 See Levit, supra note 81, at 183-87.
405 Rebecca E. Woodman, InternationalMiranda?Article 36 of the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations, 70J. KAN. B. Ass'N 41, 41 (2001).
406 See Torres v. State, 120 P.3d 1184 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005).
407 Levit, supra note 81, at 171-72.
408 Id. at 172 (citing Torres v. State, No. PCD-04-442, 2004 WL 3711623, at *1-2
(Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004) (Chapel, J., concurring)).
409 To7rres, 2004 WL 3711623, at *2-3 (Chapel, J., concurring).
410 Levit, supra note 81, at 172-73 (discussing the clemency of Torres). In a later
published opinion reviewing the remand court's analysis of whether the failure to
notify had prejudiced Torres' trial, Judge Chapel wrote for the Oklahoma Court:
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State political branches have stepped in to provide protection as
well. Because of the uncertainty of what legal effect to give a failure to
notify, two states have amended their criminal codes to explicitly require police notification in all arrests, and additional states have considered proposals. 41
The motivation behind these statutes is to
eliminate the claim of failure to notify and the additional costs associated with defending such claims, which certainly weakens, but does
not eliminate, the value of habituating police to notification. 41 2 Regardless of whether the individual who is convicted without notification at the time of arrest may raise non-notification as grounds for
suppressing statements, the habit of notification can take hold.
Moreover, the defense bar is now alerted to the value of consular
assistance and will serve as a backstop for police failures. Left open by
Sanchez-Llamas is the potential for a multitude of state and local approaches to VCCR enforcement, including the fashioning of remedies
for failure to notify. For some states it may mean that failure to raise
the consular assistance claim presents grounds for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, for others, grounds for suppression of statements made to police, or to a question of overall prejudice at trial.
Others may opt to eliminate a judicial remedy. Whatever the motives
behind state notification statutes or programs to train local law enforcement, they serve to permit the mediating effects of outside actors
and norms to enter into the criminal justice system through the VCCR
norm portal.
The essence of a Vienna Convention claim is that a foreign citizen,
haled before an unfamiliar jurisdiction and accused of a crime, is entitled to
seek the assistance of his government. Even if that assistance cannot, ultimately, affect the outcome of the proceedings, it is a right and privilege of
national citizenship and international law. The issue is not whether a government can actually affect the outcome of a citizen's case, but whether
under the Convention a citizen has the opportunity to seek and receive his
government's help. This protection extends to every signatory of the Convention, including American citizens.
Torres, 120 P.3d at 1187.
411 See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 834c, 5028 (West 2000); OR. REv. STAT. § 181.642
(2005). For cases applying the California statute, see People v. Garcia, No. C047098,
2005 WL 697970 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2005); People v. Valencia, No. A099446, 2004
WL 887210 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 27, 2004); People v. Pathan, No. H022600, 2002 WL
31854948 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 13, 2002); People v. Ortiz, No. B145601, 2002 WL
937642 (Cal. Ct. App. May 8, 2002). But see State v. Sanchez-Llamas, 108 P.3d 573
(Or. 2005) (decided before the Oregon statute was law, holding that the VCCR does
not confer individual rights to a detained foreign national to be asserted in a criminal
proceeding).
412 Aceves e-mail, supra note 316.
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By the timeJose Medellfn filed his cert petition with the Supreme
Court, a shift had occurred that resulted in: (1) improved law enforcement compliance with the notification procedure; (2) involvement of
foreign governments with meaningful defense of nationals in capital
cases; (3) heightened vigilance of defense counsel on the value of
consular involvement in consular cases; (4) openness of state court
judges to the value of consular assistance; 4 13 (5) increased awareness
in the general public (and thus among potential jurors) of potential
disadvantages of foreign nationals facing the death penalty; (6) increased receptiveness of governors and other state politicians to appeals to procedural fairness; and (7) a measurable increase in
commutations and clemencies and an accompanying decrease in capi4 14
tal sentences applied to foreign nationals.

If the Medellin line of cases resulted in only one clemency and the
avoidance of a death sentence in only a handful of cases, it can nevertheless be measured as a shift toward de facto abolition. And, to the
extent that these measurable shifts toward the abolitionist norm have
already taken place on the ground within the criminal justice systems
of the federal states, it diminishes the significance of any failure of
vertical enforcement of the Avena ruling by the Supreme Court.
V.

THE

SALIENCE

OF

NoRM

PORTALS

Given the myriad actors and various horizontal and vertical
processes at work in the Medellin cases, how can we determine which
factors were determinative in pushing the abolitionist norm to a tipping point? Part of the purpose of a constructivist approach is to
move away from the over-determination of input factors that marks
rational choice analysis. It is thus important to understand how all of
the processes and actors contributed to the norm shift. International
human rights law is centrally concerned with giving domestic legal effect to international legal norms. It is therefore useful to identify the
criteria and conditions under which domestic legal institutions courts
change to become amenable to an appeal to international human
rights.
Identification of those criteria and conditions is helpful not only
as a descriptive matter, but can help predict ways in which external
norms can be imported into the systems of persistent objectors. Understanding the nature of those mechanisms will also make them amenable to the kind of scrutiny necessary for domestic democratic
413 See, e.g., Levit, supra note 81, at 183-86 (highlighting the role of "state court
judges as co-participants in the making and shaping of international legal norms").
414 See supra notes 404-12 and accompanying text.
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accountability. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that
these transnational efforts did not occur in a vacuum. While the
VCCR was being invoked as a norm portal through which to introduce
increased procedural protections toward an abolitionist norm, other
efforts were taking place in the United States to expose problems in
the administration of the death penalty.
Why was the adoption of the VCCR as a norm portal successful in
these cases? First, the VCCR appeals to judges' and government officials' sense of obligation. While the United States may be under no
obligation to curtail the death penalty, it has made a promise to abide
by the reciprocal obligations of the VCCR. 415

The governor of

Oklahoma, in granting clemency in Torres, was quite explicit: "'I took
into account the fact that the U.S. signed the 1963 Vienna Convention
and is part of that treaty' . . . .,,46 All through the Medellin line of
cases, state and federal courts have indicated in dicta the importance
attached to such national promises.

41 7

Second, as a reciprocal obliga-

tion, the VCCR appealed to judges' and politicians' sense of duty not
to engage in acts of omission or commission that would put Americans in harm's way. Third, it is formal. A treaty, like a statute, offers
judges concrete guidelines for what is expected. This differentiates
use of norm portals from more general discussions of appeals to foreign or international legal trends that can, rightly, be criticized as selective or vague. The language of Article 36 is, to be sure, subject to
interpretation on the question of appropriate remedy, but the general
requirement of notification is not vague or ephemeral and the U.S.
government has repeatedly underscored exactly the rationales at stake
in notification. Fourth, it is a procedural requirement and thus allows
state government officials cover to comply with the treaty without having to support explicitly the expansion of rights-and the corresponding reduction in death sentences-that is facilitated by such
compliance. Finally, as a self-executing treaty binding on the state
and federal governments, it can be invoked and enforced without respect to the enforceability of the ICJ opinion. To be sure, some state
courts have restricted the availability ofjudicially cognizable remedies,
and the decoupling of U.S.-fashioned remedies allowed under
Sanchez-Llamas permits them to continue to do so. The aggregate effect of the cases, however, has been to increase compliance with notifi415 I owe Phil Peters a special thanks for suggesting this line of inquiry.
416 Press Release, State of Okla. Office of Gov. Brad Henry, Gov. Henry Grants
Clemency to Death Row Inmate Torres (May 13, 2004), available at http://wwwgovernor.state.ok.us/display.article.php?article id=301 &article type=l.
417 See supra notes 404-05 and accompanying text.
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cation and thus achieve the desired reduction in overall death
sentences.
A.

Medellin Within the Typology of Norm Transfer

In the Medellin cases, norms were communicated, elaborated and
integrated horizontally and vertically at domestic, transnational and
international levels of interaction. The notification rule was a treaty
obligation enforceable through the vertical command and control of
a supranational court. In these cases, however, it operated as a horizontal entry point into the criminal justice system of the states-at the
law enforcement, judicial and political levels-through which domestic courts were confronted with external norms. That entry point was
the well-established, codified, and formalized function of consular
protection, which mediated between the outside norm and the domestic practice.
In addition to the use of the VCCR as a horizontal norm portal,
the process of norm transfer in these cases included supranational
adjudication (ICJ, IACtHR), informal vertical efforts (UN resolution
on rights of aliens), and of course, informal horizontal efforts by advocacy support networks. These methods of norm integration in the Medellin cases can be mapped out, broadly, against the typology of norm
integration. (See Table 1).
TABLE 1 TYPOLOGY OF METHODS OF
NoRM INTEGRATION
Type
Formal Vertical

ISignificance
Characteristics
fSupranational adjudication
__

HuMAN

RIGHTS

in
Examples
ICJ, ECHR, ECJ,
IACtHR

Medellin cases
Medium

Informal
Vertical

Aspirational institutions,
norm-setting charters

UN Human Rights
Comm.; General
Assembly

Low

Formal
Horizontal

Norm portals; procedural
gateways

Extradition treaties,
VCCR, Refugee
Convention

High

Informal
Horizontal

Political and social
interactions, information
sharing, acculturation

NGOs networks,
bilateral and
multilateral diplomacy

Medium

The VCCR case study demonstrates the ways in which state and
nonstate actors engage in the process of norm transfer in traditional
and nontraditional ways and illustrates the value of the soft empiri-

cism or thick description of constructivism. Applying the constructiv-
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reveals that neither informal nor
ist methodology to the Medellfn cases
responsible for the norm
formal legal mechanisms are independently
through courts was not
shift. The vertical process of norm integration
a definitive ruling by the
determinative to the cases. For example,
itself or the ICJ order in Avena
Supreme Court on whether the VCCR
courts was not necessary to the
are to be given direct effect by U.S.
appeals to international courts were
overall shift. At the same time,
the emerging norm. The 1999
crucial along the way to elaborating
18
4
however, was a key step toward
advisory opinion of the IACtHR,
into a new international stanintegrating the notification provision
penalty cases. This suggests that
dard of procedural justice in death
role beyond the
a norm-announcing
international tribunals serve
419
function.
"command and control"

a technically narrow rulThe ICJ in this case may have provided
and obligations under the VCCR
ing intended to elaborate the rights
the effect of announcing an420enIt
to the parties before it, but it had
for aliens facing the death penalty.
hanced standard of treatment
narrow ruling is given direct effect
is thus less important whether the
can serve as either perin national courts. The norm announcement
that appeals to a general sense of
suasive authority or the kind of dicta
fairness for state judges and officials.
in interesting ways. Individual
NGOs and advocates also operated
to the initiation of the norm
advocates and clients proved essential
norm shift on the applicacascade that contributed to a quantifiable into the shoes of nationstepped
tion of the death penalty. NGOs
acted as a kind of watchdog
NGOs
states in some cases. In this case,
a
the United States, and served as
for all the governments outside
and the consulates, providing direct
bridge between public defenders
in carrying
to consular officials to assist them
resources and services 42
1
out their official roles.
299.
418 Advisory Opinion, supra note
Norms:
Tribunals and the Transmission of
Transnational
Borgen,
419 See ChristopherJ.
(manuscript
2006)
INT'L L. Rrv. (forthcoming
The Hegemony of Process, 38 GEO. WAsHi.
79 3 4
85).
at 25-27, available at http://ssrn.corD/abstractOther Mexican
was "severe penalties." Avena and
420 The language of the opinion
http://www.icj-cij.org/icj
151 (Mar. 31), available at
Nationals, 2004 I.CJ. 1, para.
20040331.pdf. This leaves
www/idocket/imus/imusjudgment/imus-imusjudgment
foreign nationals facing life
due
consideration
open the possibility that the additional
through the VCCR
vulnerable to a concerted assault
to minor
sentences without parole may be
protections
the
1CJ was not extending
norm portal. In any event, the
crimes.
is innote 304 (explaining that the document
421 See generallyJAMEs ET AL., supra
defending foreign nationals).
tended to be used by attorneys
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Despite the persistence of traditional diplomacy as a method of
interaction, relative to the role of other actors, the role of nationstates qua states appears to be diminishing in transnational human
rights litigation. This bears out constructivist and TLP predictions
about the role of nonstate actors and the salience of norms and ideas
themselves. Mexico, Germany, and Paraguay each supplemented interstate diplomacy with direct appeals to the subsidiary federal states,
and with direct participation as amici or litigants in U.S. proceedings.
Sandra Babcock has said the following of Paraguay's and Mexico's efforts in these cases:
Viewed through the lens of Koh's [TLP] model, Paraguay's and
Mexico's efforts on behalf of their nationals succeeded in provoking
interactions with the lower federal courts, the US Supreme Court,
the ICJ and several foreign governments, furthering the internalization of international norms regarding the death penalty. Today,
dozens of foreign nationals on death row continue to litigate the
claims first raised by Faulder, Breard and others. Foreign govern-

ments have also continued their efforts to block the executions of
their nationals, by litigating both in domestic courts and before international tribunals. This litigation has led other international lawmaking fora to issue decisions condemning the execution of foreign
nationals who were deprived of any opportunity for consular
422
assistance.
Missing from Babcock's description are the international conditions that made it possible, even likely, that Mexico and Paraguay
would challenge the United States on the death penalty. The essential
pre-condition was the shifting international consensus on the death
penalty. The Medellin cases came about when they did because the
abolition of the death penalty had reached an international tipping
point. Between 1989 and 1995, co-extensive with the end of the Cold
War and the emergence of several newly democratic and democratiz-

ing states, the international norm moved from one of death penalty
toleration to abolition. This shift was powerful enough to prompt
states to take a position on judicial enforceability of individual rights
under the VCCR that seemed at odds with the history of consular
protection.
The death penalty norm cascade further primed the IACtHR and
ICJ to rule on the VCCR in a way that appeared to be contrary to longstanding practice and interpretation of the parties to the convention.
Some might argue that the parties to the international litigations were
motivated by anti-Americanism, or at least an attempt to assert sover422

Babcock, supra note 62, at 379.
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eignty and counterbalance U.S. political hegemony through legal
challenges. Such views cannot be totally discounted, as diplomatic
and political motivations certainly played a role along with the antideath penalty concerns. Whatever the motivations, however, it was
the fact of widespread VCCR noncompliance of the United States that
enabled the international tribunals to rule as they did.
The Medellin line of cases also raises some interesting questions
about the U.S. reaction. The U.S. position that the notification provision of the VCCR did not create a judicially cognizable individual
right was consistent up through and beyond the adverse Avena ruling.
U.S. courts are generally deferential to the executive branch on questions of treaty interpretation. 42 3 Here, the U.S. government acted,
often in contradictory ways, through multiple disaggregated entities,
each with a slightly different approach. Taken together, these disaggregated acts dilute the effect of American persistent objection to de
jure abolition. At the federal level, those disaggregated entities were
the State Department (consistently arguing at the international level
to give no judicial effect to the VCCR, 424 but appealing directly to
state governors for clemency and setting in place training and guidance on notification procedures), 425 Congress (keeping in place the
restrictions on habeas appeal and failing to adopt national guidelines
on notification),426 and the President (issuing a memorandum of
compliance with Avena, unilaterally withdrawing from the Optional
Protocol of the VCCR).427 At the state and local levels, police and
prosecutors shifted practice in response to federal pressures, and legislatures have taken up the question of whether and how to codify the
notification obligation.4 28 While federalism has been viewed as an obstacle to bringing U.S. human rights practices up to the international
standard, the use of the VCCR demonstrates that state courts can be
more receptive to arguments based on international law, particularly
29
where the argument is made through a formal U.S. commitment. 4
423 See BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 77, at 442-51.
424 See, e.g., Avena, 2004 I.C.J., paras. 29-30; LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), para.
40 (June 27, 2001), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/igus/igusjudgment/igus ijudgment20010625.htm.
425 See, e.g., supra notes 268-69 and accompanying text.
426 See supra text accompanying note 206.
427 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
428 See, e.g., supra note 411 and accompanying text.
429 A notable example is the Missouri Supreme Court, which in Roper v. Simmons
invoked views of the international community. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112
S.W.3d 397, 411 (Mo. 2003), affd, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
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It would be misleading to suggest that invoking the VCCR as a
norm portal was the only tactic being applied by transnational and
domestic abolitionist advocacy networks. The period between 1990
and 2004 witnessed a variety of other approaches and innovations to
limiting the judicial application of the death penalty in the United
States that coincided with the appeal to international norms. 43 0 The
measurable reduction in death sentences and actual executions between 1995 and 2005 is therefore likely the product of several variables: changes in the attitude and behavior of jurors and judges; a
reduction of the kinds of violent crimes eligible for capital punishment; innocence projects; and even political expediency. 43' The fact
that VCCR-based claims were just one of many factors contributing to
this de facto reduction in death penalty sentences and executions,
however, does not lessen its value as a norm portal. As with many
other areas of human rights expansion, many frontal attacks on the
practice can be made at once.
The fact that the VCCR has been invoked as a norm portal for
purposes other than to reduce the death penalty also does not diminish its overall salience. Indeed, that it has been invoked to ensure
minimal due process and overcome prejudice, bias, or discrimination
against foreign nationals in accordance with international standards
tends to support its importance as a norm portal for external norms.
Further, the fact that the VCCR may centrally protect sovereign prerogatives of protection does not dilute its role as a norm portal. Other
treaties or structures that serve as norm portals may have other primary purposes-extradition treaties are not, for example, fundamentally a filter system, but are intended to facilitate and make more
expedient the transfer of suspects and defendants. 4 32 That they can
additionally serve to mediate between legal systems and harmonize
death penalty practice, does not detract from their central purpose. 433
430 Among these were the rise of the use of DNA to try to prove actual innocence,
and the publication of several important studies demonstrating high rates of error
and racial bias in capital sentencing. For links to studies and relevant articles, see
Int'l Justice Project, Brief Bank & General Resources, http://www.internationaljustice
project.org/briefs.cfm#resources (last visited Oct. 14, 2006).
431 Following Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), juries, not judges, must determine death sentences. Id. at 587. In December of that year Kansas also declared the
death penalty unconstitutional under its state constitution. See State v. Marsh, 102
P.3d 445, 458 (Kan. 2004), rev'd, 126 S. Ct. 2516 (2006).
432 See M. CHERIF BAsslOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION 735-49 (4th ed. 2002).
433 Requiring assurances that the death penalty will not be sought against extraditable defendants usually results in an agreement to seek, at most, a life sentence. Id. at
739 n.476 (citing U.S.-U.K. extradition treaty).
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Historically, American advocates have resisted raising international law generally (and international human rights defenses in criminal cases more specifically) in U.S. courts. Sandra Babcock attributes
this resistance to education: "International law is not a required subject in the vast majority of law schools in the United States. As a result,
few law school graduates understand the relevance of international
law in domestic legal proceedings." 4 34 An additional reason posited is

the related concern that judges-themselves the products of law
school experiences that did not adequately introduce them to international law-will be unreceptive: "'[Llitigators [ .... look at judges,
and assess what they will find persuasive. International law has not fit
that criteria. Indeed, some litigators have been concerned that citations to international law would signal an essential weakness in their
case under domestic law.'- 435 Thus, the actions of the judges in these
cases will affect the ways in which future litigants raise international
human rights arguments.
The Medellin cases suggest that perhaps judges (and state officials) care more about some kinds of international law than others.
Here, the VCCR represented a firm promise made by the United
States. The federal government acknowledged its obligations under
the VCCR and even conceded the widespread noncompliance with
the notification provisions. 436 Congress made clear that the treaty
would be "self-executing," that is, it would not require implementing
legislation.43 7 This is in contrast with appeals in the Atkins and Roper
cases to the ICCPR Optional Protocol 2 or the International Convention on the Rights of the Child as evidence of a standard: the United
States was not party to those international obligations.
B.

Mapping Other Norm Portals

Understanding how the formal horizontal method of norm transfer has operated in the VCCR case is illustrative of how other norm
portals may operate to facilitate the entry of horizontal integration of
international human rights into the legal systems of other persistent
objectors or noncompliant states. 4 38 Bilateral extradition treaties and
international refugee law have operated in the past to limit the appli434 Babcock, supra note 62, at 374 n.31.
435 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Martha F. Davis, Lecture, International
Human Rights and United States Law: Predictionsof a Courtwatcher,64 ALB. L. REv. 417,
418 (2000)).
436 See supra text accompanying note 212.
437 See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
438 See supra tbl.
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cation of the death penalty in foreign states. 439 In both those formal

systems, a binding treaty obligation acts to export international and foreign norms. In extradition, bilateral and multilateral treaties have
been used as a means through which to consider the appropriateness
of the death penalty, with many states refusing to extradite in the absence of a guarantee that the death penalty will not be sought. 440 In
refugee cases, a host of international human rights standards (including prohibitions against the death penalty, torture and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment) have been applied to practices that
that have been interpreted by different national courts as meeting the
standard of "reasonable fear of persecution" established in the Refugee Convention. 441 These interpretations have the effect of preventing future human rights violations in the sending state and thus, in
effect, altering the practice in that state as regards specific individuals
or broad classes. Some arguments made by human rights activists to
invoke immigration law in the pursuit of human rights protection suggest that general immigration law-which establishes a literal portal to
states' jurisdictions-might also serve as a norm portal for transnational regulation of human rights. 442
International jurisdictional rules may also serve as horizontal
norm portals. Through criminal universal jurisdiction, for example,
criminal jurisdiction is permitted in all legal systems on the theory
that all countries are bound by jus cogens norms to prosecute crimes
against humanity without regard to principles of territorial or national

439 See BASSIOUNI, supra note 432, at 735-51 (discussing the death penalty as
grounds for exception, exemption or exclusion under a number of bilateral and multilateral extradition treaties); see, e.g., Extradition Treaty with Great Britain and Northern Ireland, art. V, U.S.-Britain-N. Ir., Mar. 31, 2003, S. TREAIY Doc. No. 108-23, art.
1; see Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, adopted July 28, 1951, art.
I(A) (2), 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention].
440 See discussion of Canadian extradition cases supra notes 285-301. See also In re
Soering, 1988 CRiM. L. REv. 307. For a discussion of Soering, see BAssIOUNI, supra note
432, at 739-41.
441 See Refugee Convention, supra note 439, art. I(A)(2); see also GUY GOODWINGILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 40-79 (2d ed. 1996) (examining what practices are considered persecution under the Convention); Lori A. Nessel, Forced to
Choose: Torture,Family Reunification and United States Immigration Policy, 78 TEMP. L. REv.
897, 897 & n.5 (2005) (discussing national asylum laws that prohibit repatriation of
foreign nationals who will face death penalty or torture upon return to their home
country).
442 See, e.g., William J. Aceves & Paul L. Hoffman, Using Immigration Law to Protect
Human Rights: A Critique of Recent Legislative Proposals,23 Micu. J. INT'L L. 733, 769-72
(2002).
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jurisdiction. 4 43 Efforts to expand universal jurisdiction to include jurisdiction over civil claims, such as mass environmental torts, may represent a new mechanism through which to import international
44 4
norms into the legal systems of persistent objectors.
C.

The Robustness of Norm Portals

Rather than dilute the democratic accountability of laws that are
applied in U.S. courts, use of norm portals may be democracy-enhancing. Norm portals are formal mechanisms that reflect the increased
legalization of the modern international human rights system. While
the international human rights system may, as a matter of philosophical underpinning, represent a return to natural law and a move away
from the positivism that marked interstate relations in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, it is nonetheless a formal system

4 45

Norm portals, as formal mechanisms, add a layer of precision to the
process through which international human rights norms seep into
domestic legal systems. This formalism may also save them from the
democracy concerns raised when nonbinding foreign or international
law is directly invoked in U.S. courts.
Moreover, the use of international human rights law is different
from the application of other international law and, of course, foreign
law. International human rights law is typically only invoked when it is
rights-expanding. Thus, objections to substantive human rights are
infrequently used by the U.S. government to defend nonenforcement.
Rather, the government tends to rely on other formal elements of international law to argue that the external norm is unenforceable in
U.S. courts. In particular, the government invokes the international
law of treaties to defend nonadoption of a norm (as with ICCPR Optional Protocol 2), the law of reservations to treaties to defend federalism constraints on enforcement (as with U.S. reservations to the
ICCPR), and also the general limits of the applicability of customary
international law in those areas where the United States has not
adopted the treaty standard. The Eighth Amendment arguably provides a unique constitutional entry point (perhaps acting as a norm
portal within the Bill of Rights) in that it permits taking into account
443

See, e.g., James Cockayne, On the Cosmopolitanizationof CriminalJurisdiction,3 J.
514, 523 (2005) (book review).
444 These examples are merely illustrative. I plan a more comprehensive mapping
of potential norm portals as a follow-on project.
445 See Louis Henkin, Human Rights: Ideology and Aspiration, Reality and Prospect, in
REALiZING HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 15-16 (Samantha Power & Graham Allison eds., 2000);
PHILIP ALSTON & HENRY STEINER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT (3d ed.
2006).
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standards" of "cruel and
international fairness under the "evolving
unusual."

4 46

standards on human
That is not to say that some international
for the United States. Internarights may present unique dilemmas
to life" that might also incorporate
tional interpretations of the "right
the privacy rights outlined in Roe
a ban on abortion may conflict with
against some kinds of speech
47
v. Wade.4 International protections
constitutional protections. In those
might similarly run afoul of U.S.
to an open norm portal by shutcases, the United States can respond
withthe treaty, but it is not clear that
ting it through withdrawal from
matter,
the VCCR (or, for that
drawal is a practical option for
extradition treaties).
importance to the protection
The VCCR is of such fundamental
abroad that withdrawal may
of U.S. business and American citizens
best
United States has done the next
not, in practice, be feasible. The
Protocol. Withdrawal from
thing by withdrawing from the Optional
appear to have affected the norm
the protocol does not, however,
as a
in U.S. courts. While it is true
shift that has already occurred
in LaGrandand Avena are only
doctrinal matter that the ICJ opinions
to those cases, and that withdrawal
directly binding on the parties
any future ICJ litigation on the
from the Optional Protocol prevents
an
VCCR is interpreted as creating
matter, those cases in which the
remedy must be provided, remain
individual right to which a concrete
for interpretation of the rights of
as an international rule of decision
thus accomplished a one-way imporforeign nationals. The VCCR has
havcapital cases. And it is already 448
tation of additional protection in
noncapital cases and civil cases.
ing important residual effects in
role in interstate relations
Norm portals also serve an important
The United States takes the VCCR
by equalizing the reciprocity game.
that it have full access to American
seriously because it is concerned
Thus, when the State Department
citizens who are detained overseas.
the governors of Virginia and
communicated its concerns with
of obligation. Of course, the
Oklahoma, it focused on this reciprocity
for retaliation as, for exVCCR does not offer tit-for-tat opportunities the WTO Dispute Settleunder
ample, violations of the trade regime
parties who might wish to
the
ment Understanding. Moreover,
American citizens without access
retaliate, for example, by detaining
inclined to do so in light of overto the U.S. government, are not
446
39, 48
447
448

YALE L.J.
Court and the Law of Nations, 104
See Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme
(1994).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
367, 384-85 (7th Cir. 2005).
See, e.g., jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d
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whelming U.S. power and its ability to inflict greater economic or
even military harm. Nonetheless, the invocation of the VCCR or an
extradition treaty offers a formalized method of extracting a penalty
from the United States for failing in its reciprocal obligation.
CONCLUSION

The sovereigntists are right that views of people outside the
United States are affecting how cases get decided. But they are wrong
about how it is coming about. The fears of unaccountable, cosmopolitan judges with life tenure picking and choosing from international
and foreign decisions are as overblown as the claims of responsible
global judicial dialogue. It was not the judges on the international
cocktail circuit who brought about the norm shift in these cases. Indeed, Justice Breyer seemed to concede the relatively minor role of
judges in the process of legal globalization when he put the burden
on lawyers to raise international law issues in their arguments. 449 To
the extent that judges do take on an internationalist bent, it is in extremely subtle ways, and ways which are, ultimately, framed in U.S.
notions of fairness and justice-a kind of "good" American
450
exceptionalism.
It was also not "unaccountable" international institutions that
started the norm cascade, but rather individual advocates and national governments. 4 51 Norm portals may facilitate changes in U.S.
human rights practice that some sovereigntists will object to as reflecting restraints on U.S. power. The Medellin cases demonstrate, however, that invocation of international human rights law through the
VCCR norm portal has operated similarly to other novel claims in U.S.
courts that have led to "tipping points" on important social and legal
norms.
Following Sanchez-Llamas, state officials and judges are free to
elaborate the obligations of the VCCR and require state remedies for
failure to comply fully with the notification provision. Such actions
raise none of the democratic or sovereignty concerns implicated when
nonbinding foreign or international law is invoked in interpreting in449 Breyer, supra note 23, at 267-68.
450 See Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1479,
1480-94 (2003) (distinguishing between "good" American exceptionalism emanating
from historical, cultural and political distinctions that result in exemplary U.S. human
rights performance from "bad" exceptionalism under which the United States remains outside the international legal fold).
451 See supra Part WV.B.
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dividual rights under the Constitution. 45 2 Indeed, short of acceding
to international commitments to abolish capital punishment, the
VCCR norm portal may represent the most effective and democratically defensible means through which to help nudge U.S. human
rights practice toward the international standard.

452 Seejudith Resnik, Law's Migration:American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and
Federalism'sMultiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE Lj. 1564, 1598-1606 (2006).

